The Goldilocks Paradox: Constructions of Readiness for Therapy on Adult Acute Wards by Reiss, R. & Reiss, R.
1 
 
 
 
THE GOLDILOCKS PARADOX: CONSTRUCTIONS OF 
READINESS FOR THERAPY ON ADULT ACUTE WARDS 
 
 
ROWAN REISS  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of 
the University of East London for the degree of Doctor of 
Clinical Psychology 
 
 
May 2018 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The aim of this thesis is to explore how clinicians working in adult acute settings 
construct their understandings of readiness for therapy, utilising a Foucauldian 
discourse analysis (FDA).  
 
The first part presents a critical review of the literature considering the 
multifarious discursive constructions of readiness for therapy. These are 
considered in relation to the differing therapeutic approaches, illustrating the 
socio-historical construction of this concept. Constructions of readiness for 
therapy are also considered in relation to the lack of research and treatment 
development in inpatient acute settings and the inherent implications for this 
absence: primarily lack of provision of, or access to, therapy.  
 
The analysis is then presented, employing semi-structured interviews to explore 
how five clinical psychologists and five psychiatrists conceptualise the construct 
of readiness for therapy in their work in acute inpatient psychiatric settings. 
Transcripts were analysed using an FDA. 
 
The thesis adopts a critical realist social constructionist epistemological position 
in order to facilitate the exploration of readiness for therapy as a construct both 
at the level of discourse in the text and at a wider institutional level. This 
position also enables consideration of contextual and social factors and their 
implications for subjectivity. 
 
The analysis demonstrated that clinicians constructed their understandings of 
readiness for therapy in three main ways. They constructed readiness for 
therapy in relation to the requirement for a particular ‘ideal’ therapeutic subject 
constituted through processes of subjectification. They constructed 
‘unreadiness’ for therapy as a tool to support their position as ‘expert’ through 
disciplining practices of surveillance and coding. Finally they constructed 
broader service contexts - service structures, regulatory guidance and therapy 
itself - as barriers to their ability to provide therapy in this setting; thus facilitating 
their subject-positioning as ‘ethical’ practitioners.  
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As a consequence of these discursive constructions it is therefore very unlikely 
that patients in these settings would fulfil criteria necessary for them to be 
considered ‘ready’ for therapy and to thus have access to therapy.  
 
This thesis recommends utilising the Power Threat Meaning framework 
(Johnstone & Boyle, 2018) to enable dominant biomedical discourses to be 
challenged in facilitating differing constructions of readiness for therapy, more 
suited to the context of inpatient acute settings. The lack of and need for 
research in this clinical area is acknowledged.  Recommendations are made 
that therapeutic approaches should be pragmatic and flexible in their attempts 
to meet the needs of the patients admitted to inpatient acute wards.  
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Conceptualisations of readiness for therapy (hereafter referred to as RFT) are 
multifarious and multidimensional. From engagement, psychological 
mindedness or stages of change, to assessment scales focusing on ‘insight’ 
and a profusion of published research in this area; the assumptions 
underpinning the use of these ideas, whether overtly discussed and assessed 
or indirectly expressed, enter into many clinical discussions and have the 
capacity to influence treatment decisions and access to therapy. The problem 
this study aims to address therefore relates to how RFT is constructed in 
inpatient settings and the implications of these constructions for subjectivities 
and for practice. 
 
In order to address this question, I will take a Foucauldian frame to 
understanding RFT. This frame enables us to view RFT as socially constructed 
and culturally and historically situated whilst also facilitating an exploration of 
the impact of discursive practices on subjectification and on material outcomes 
relating to access to therapy. Analysis in the Foucauldian sense understands 
language as being more than the means to communicate and translate our 
experiences into words. Rather, the experiences themselves are formed by the 
ways they are expressed and understood in language (Oksala, 2016).  The 
‘linguistic turn’, one of the most important shifts in Western philosophy during 
the twentieth century, thus opens up new avenues for understanding the nature 
of reality and is crucial in comprehending processes of subjectification.  
 
Subjectification, taken from the French “assujetir” meaning both to make subject 
to and to produce subjectivity (Henriques, Hollway, Urwin, Venn & Walkerdine, 
1998), involves the construction of identity as social, historical and culturally 
located. Identity is seen here not as static or reified, but as relating to a subject 
who is continually co-constructed in social action (Burr, 2003). Foucault’s 
writings focused on the production of certain types of subjects: the mad, the ill, 
the criminal (McHoul & Grace, 1993) through discourse, within the 
power/knowledge networks of society. Power relations thus shape behaviour 
and awareness and are constitutive of the subjects themselves (Oksala, 2016). 
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Through exploration of how ten clinicians working in adult inpatient acute 
settings construct their understandings of RFT, this research will address the 
construction of RFT in relation to processes of subjectification.  
 
The introduction will first provide context regarding the nature of in-patient 
settings in the UK, their history and current construction. It will then address the 
provision of therapy in these settings and policy recommendations for clinical 
practice in this area. Constructions of therapy will then be addressed. There will 
follow a literature review regarding RFT, which will critically examine how this 
construct is functioning in the literature and how it is addressed in relation to 
inpatient settings. Finally it will outline why this issue may be problematic in the 
context of inpatient settings. 
 
1.1 Language 
 
For the purposes of this study the term ‘therapy’ will refer specifically to 
psychological therapies and exclude other types such as occupational therapy. 
Throughout this thesis the phrase ‘RFT’ will be used to describe a broad set of 
phenomena and research, which contains alternatives and subcategories to this 
concept. The various constructs which can be seen to come under the umbrella 
of RFT, or a similar group of ideas, have been present for a long time in ways 
that people talk about therapy and psychiatry. This phrase was chosen as a 
term that is regularly used in clinical practice and would be easily 
understandable to participants as a naturally occurring part of their working 
language.  
 
Whilst wishing to remain aware of and avoid the use of pathologising language, 
in describing the subject constructed by the participants in this study, the word 
‘patient’ will be employed. This choice of construction is acknowledged to be a 
thorny issue, especially taking into consideration the processes of 
subjectification explored in this study and the looping effects of “human kinds” 
(Hacking, 1995). For a group that has experienced and endured a long history 
of stigmatization, careful consideration of use of such a label is especially 
pertinent. The reasons for use of the term ‘patient’; as opposed to ‘client’, 
‘service user’, ‘survivor’, expert-by-experience’, ‘consumer’ or any other number 
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of terms, which have sprung up in attempts to address the inherent tension 
created by the use of the word ‘patient’ in these contexts are manifold: firstly, in 
surveys participants have been found to prefer the word “patient” (Upton, Boer 
& Neale, 1994; Ritchie, Hayes & Ames, 2000). Secondly, the language, 
throughout the data, of madness and distress construct these experiences as 
mental illness with inherent implications of parity with physical health. 
Additionally, this choice reflects the language frequently, but not always, used 
by the participants interviewed. Finally, the choice to use ‘patient’ reflects the 
setting: in which many of the people on the ward are there compulsorily, are not 
choosing to use services as a ‘client’ or ‘service user’ and are not positioned as 
‘expert’ in the power-knowledge nexus. My choosing to use the term ‘patient’ is 
therefore consciously done to make explicit the lack of agency, which is, in 
itself, a form of resistance.  
 
1.2 A History of Inpatient Settings  
 
In Madness and Civilization (Foucault, 1965), Foucault describes how, following 
the waning of sovereign and religious power during the Enlightenment in 
Western societies, rationality became an organizing principle of how society 
functioned. Madness was no longer seen as ‘unreason’ in dialogue with reason. 
It was excluded and opposed to what was rational and, in essence, human. As 
a result of this process the mad were not only physically confined and isolated 
but also excluded on a conceptual level from the realm of reason and humanity 
(Oksala, 2007). In the late 18th century madness underwent another change 
and was understood as mental illness. The birth of the psychiatric asylum was, 
by traditional explanations, a ‘liberation’ of the mad; a recognition of the ‘true’ 
nature of madness as mental illness. County asylums were built and legislation 
such as the Shaftesbury Acts (Cooper, 1845) supported the ‘regulation of the 
care and treatment of lunatics’ (Hunter & McAlpine, 1974, p254). Foucault, 
however, argues that the insane, although no longer confined by chains and 
cells, were now just as imprisoned by the strict moral rules and values of the 
‘liberators’. 
The madman as ‘patient’ now under the complete authority of psychiatric 
knowledge. Foucault’s aim was to demonstrate the grounding of modern, so 
called ‘humane’, conceptualisations of madness as mental illness, in historical 
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practices of confinement. Whether or not we accept Foucault’s reading of this 
history, one can say that in 1954, shortly before the process of 
deinstitutionalization was initiated, asylums housed approximately 154,000 
people.  Minimally funded and overcrowded, they comprised 40 % of inpatient 
beds in the NHS whilst receiving only 20 % of the hospital budget (Goodwin, 
1996).  
 
1.3 Deinstitutionalization 
 
Against a background of changing social attitudes to mental illness, 
emphasizing human rights, the 1959 Mental Health Act determined the 
community as the most appropriate context of care for people with mental 
health problems.  In 1951, the then Health Secretary Enoch Powell gave his 
now-famous ‘water-tower’ speech condemning the asylums. Addressing the 
transition to community-based care, his speech set events in motion for the shift 
to community care. The development of community-based alternatives to 
hospital care has since gone through a plethora of developments in relation to 
emerging research and changes in social context. It is beyond the scope of this 
study to outline these developments in detail. However, the closure of the 
asylums was completed and, outside of a few large-scale forensic units, no 
large-scale institutions in this model of care now exist in the UK.  
 
1.4 Current Practices and Structures in Acute Inpatient Services  
 
Bed numbers available for mental illness dropped from a peak of approximately 
150,000 in 1955 to 22,300 in 2012, with a 62.1 % reduction from 56,112 to 
18,630 between 1986/8 and 2015/6 (Ewbank, Thompson, & McKenna, 2017)). 
Over-occupancy is a common issue with a Freedom of Information request 
finding an average inpatient ward bed occupancy rate of 101% and some wards 
operating at 134% capacity in August 2013 (Crisp, Smith & Nicholson, 2016).. 
The raising of admission thresholds, was found by Mind’s (2011) enquiry to be a 
recurrent theme with patients being told they were ‘not ill enough’ or ‘too ill’ in 
some cases, to meet admission criteria (Mind, 2011). By 2013 the UK had 54 
psychiatric beds per 100,000 compared with the OECD average of 58 (Hewlett 
& Moran, 2014). There have been suggestions that reductions in bed numbers 
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“may have gone too far” (Crisp, Smith & Nicholson, 2016) and that inpatient 
care has been unnecessarily demonised within the field of organisational 
research (Kapur et al, 2016).  
 
Moreover, it has been argued that a process of reinstitutionalisation is already 
underway and is happening largely unnoticed by the public and with minimal 
professional debate. This process, it is claimed, is occurring both via an 
increase in forensic beds and supported housing placements and through 
institutionalized cultures remaining the same either within community teams or 
in the context of smaller acute wards (Priebe et al,  2005).  
 
1.4.1 The Population of the Ward 
Due to these longstanding policy objectives of community-based alternatives to 
hospital care, the severity of illness in inpatient settings has increased (Gilburt, 
Peck, Ashton, Edwards & Naylor, 2014). These changes have also had an 
impact on the mixture of diagnoses on inpatient wards with a higher proportion 
of patients with diagnoses of psychosis or schizophrenia and significantly 
reduced admission rates for those with affective disorders (Hunt, Rahman, 
While, Windfuhr, Shaw, Appleby & Kapur, 2014). It has been well established 
that psychiatric illness rates are higher in black and minority ethnic (BME) 
groups, with findings of significant and sustained differences in experience of 
mental health services and outcomes of interventions between the white 
majority and minority ethnic groups (Cochrane and Sashidharan,1996). Black 
Caribbean patients with a diagnosis of psychosis or bipolar disorder, for 
example, are more likely to be detained in hospital compulsorily (Commander, 
Odell, Surtees & Sashidharan, 2003) whilst higher rates of hospital admissions 
for mental health problems for people from black and minority ethnic groups 
who are more likely to be detained under a section of the Mental Health Act, 
more likely to be medicated and more likely to experience a poor outcome from 
treatment, have been well documented (Sashidharan, 2003).  
 
1.4.2 Experiences of Being on the Ward  
A crisis care report by Mind (2011) found that many people reported 
experiences of “dirty wards, lack of human contact, a lack of respect often 
bordering on rudeness by staff, and a reliance on force” (p. 5) suggesting that 
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mental health services have lost touch with basic humane principals (Mind, 
2011).  
 
“Quality of life on the ward was terrible, it was a violent place to be. I was 
repeatedly hit and had things stolen but most of the nurses did not care. The 
hospital was filthy and the staff stressed and over-worked, access to different 
therapies was non-existent. They moved my bed eight times in four weeks! 
Mostly without my knowledge till I tried to find my bed and belongings.” 
 
“On the ward, my care was a knock on the door at 10am to go and get my 
meds, and a knock every few days to see the psychiatrist. I had no one-to-one 
conversations with any nurses or support workers except one when I spent a 
day on eyesight obs. I felt extremely safe on the ward, and benefited from 
speaking to others with mental health problems. I got more ‘therapy’ from them 
than I did any of the staff.” 
 
(Mind, 2011, p. 22). 
 
Patient feedback on the experience of being on the ward is evidently 
overwhelmingly negative, with reports of a lack of activity, little interaction or 
therapeutic input and widespread issues around violence and risk.   
 
1.5 Constructions of Therapy  
 
It is outside the scope of this thesis to provide a comprehensive account of the 
origins and history of therapy. This section will therefore outline therapy from 
three perspectives: Firstly a definition of how therapy will be conceptualised for 
the purposes of this study. Secondly a reflexive statement of my own position in 
relation to therapy and finally a critical account of how therapy is rendered 
problematic in relation to critical and Foucauldian perspectives, comprising the 
main theoretical approaches to therapy in the West. 
 
As stated, the term ‘therapy’ will refer specifically to psychological therapies. 
Due to the participants’ professional qualifications and positions in inpatient 
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services - as psychiatrists and clinical psychologists - the majority of discourse 
in the data relates to therapy as provided by clinical psychologists.  
 
My own position in relation to therapy has shifted, perhaps foreseeably, over the 
course of carrying out this piece of research. I approached the study from the 
perspective that therapy is a force for good, enabling change and providing 
support in times of emotional distress. Whilst I still believe that therapy can be a 
positive entity in many situations, my analysis and reading has heightened my 
awareness of its more problematic aspects. These will now be outlined below.  
 
Since the 1950’s therapy, under the broad umbrella of treatment of mental 
illness, has been critiqued as part of a power-knowledge nexus around mental 
health and distress. R.D. Laing (1967) and his followers maintain that treatment 
of mental illnesses such as psychosis represents a means of avoiding the 
political issues involved such as family difficulties and societal pressures. 
Therapeutic regimes in hospitals, according to this viewpoint, are expressive of 
a societal desire for its members to behave in an appropriate and economically 
productive manner. Thomas Szasz (1974) elaborated on the antipsychiatry 
movement as conceptualized by Laing. He argued that the representation of 
madness as a disease is fundamentally a category error (Ryle, 1949) born of 
confusion over the nature of mind as conceptualised by Cartesian metaphysics; 
an error in philosophical judgement which, in creating the ‘myth’ of mental 
illness, has given the medical profession a dangerous authority to imprison and 
manipulate the mad under the guise of benevolence (Miller, 1983). With its 
roots in the work of Foucault, Donzelot and Castel, the psy-complex, as 
formulated by Ingleby (1985) and Rose (1985) refers to all disciplines that 
concern themselves with mental health and can be seen to highlight the 
emergence of psychology as an administrative technology of assessment and 
surveillance within modernizing state apparatuses (Burman, 2015). More 
specifically, in relation to therapy, Rose formulates the psy-complex within 
notions of governmentality as a method of self-knowledge productive of 
reflexive, self-regulating subjects (Burman, 2015). Rose (1990) has suggested 
that psychology is attractive to all modern, or modernizing, societies, in part as 
a result of its capacity ‘to achieve socially desirable objectives through the 
disciplining of human differences, amongst other things’ (Louw, 2005). 
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Therapeutic psychology, argues Smail (2011), manages to “obscure from our 
view the full significance for our emotional suffering of the workings of material 
reality” (p. 226). More recently the subject position of ‘consumer’ as opposed to 
‘patient’ or ‘survivor’ (Speed, 2006) has arisen within government policy 
rhetoric, based on a belief in the importance of choice and of competition 
between providers and the ‘personalisation’ agenda (Holloway, 2012). As Rose 
outlines, this discursive positioning is tied inextricably to neo-liberal discourses 
of individualization and ‘responsibilization’ (Rose, 1999), placing increasing 
weight on the responsibility of individuals to manage their psychological well-
being. This delineates it as something the healthcare ‘consumer’ has a choice 
to access, thus keeping the focus on the individual rather than the society they 
live in and serving to further minimize the perceived impact of social inequalities 
(Speed, 2006). 
 
Before proceeding to a critical analysis of the literature it is necessary to provide 
some context as to the philosophical delineation of the main therapeutic 
approaches as they relate to RFT. 
 
1.5.1 Psychoanalytic Approaches  
The fundamental proposition of psychoanalytic thinking: that unconscious 
processes: thoughts, defences and drives, are dynamically interacting and 
engaging outside our conscious recognition, created an important shift in the 
positioning of the subject. From the rational subject of the classical period - one 
who acquires knowledge empirically, via sensory experience i.e. observation 
(Psillos & Curd, 2013) - to one with an unconscious, operating outside the realm 
of rationality and reason. Thus the concept of a rational subject is replaced with 
the de-centered subject, throwing into doubt Descartes’ “cogito ergo sum” by 
questioning the place of a conscious ego as a source of thought.  Processes of 
subjectification in psychoanalysis thus construct the therapeutic subject as one 
who can gain self-knowledge through the expertise of the analyst (Temperley, 
1984), thus positioning the analyst as ‘expert’. Foucault’s concept of the 
confessional (Foucault, 1982) as a technology of power is a key concept in this 
context. As the scientific revolution progressed, knowledge that had been 
deployed through religious technologies of power, shifted to psychological 
knowledge whereby the individual is required to divulge intimate and personal 
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information no longer to the priest but to the analyst. As Smail (2011) 
underlines: Freud “poured scorn on religion as a means of containing and 
disciplining the masses, but certainly does not notice that in proffering 
psychoanalysis as the (scientific) answer he is simply replacing one opiate with 
another” (p, 232).  
 
1.5.2 Cognitive and Behavioural Approaches 
Behavioural techniques emerged during the 1970’s in response to the 
dominance of the psychoanalytic approach. More recently cognitive behavioural 
therapy (CBT), developed by Aaron Beck through the integration of cognitive 
and behavioural theory, proposes that people can become stuck in 
dysfunctional patterns of thinking and behaviour, the cognitions are seen as 
affecting our emotional and behavioural responses and as patterns of thought 
which can be changed through individual efforts. CBT is currently a privileged 
treatment approach, institutionally sanctioned within inpatient settings (Taylor & 
Perera, 2015). Treatment for schizophrenia, for example, commonly involves a 
combination of antipsychotic medication, social support and CBT or family 
therapy (NICE, 2014). The clinician’s judgement about the correct way for the 
subject to think about their experiences is privileged as they identify “negative 
automatic thoughts” through normalizing processes of subjectification. 
Positioned epistemologically within a realist method of research, CBT thus 
aligns itself to the dominant biomedical framework.  
 
 
Both psychoanalytic and cognitive approaches share an assumption of 
individual pathology, whereby ‘faulty cognitions’ or ‘defence mechanisms’ are 
located in the individual and thus wider contextual factors are not privileged. 
This assumption of individualism, supported by the minimization and distancing 
of negligibly acknowledged contextual factors, has been argued by Boyle (2011) 
to be a ‘safety behaviour’ enabling the continuance of the biomedical model. 
Thus using a diagnosis such as schizophrenia and a therapy such as CBT for 
psychosis (CBTp) may serve to obscure the impact of context, depoliticizing 
distress by disregarding the impact of trauma, inequality and abusive social 
structures, negating political and public responsibility in addressing these 
difficulties and placing responsibility for change in the distressed individual 
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(Patel, 2003). As noted, the role of the psy-complex is crucial in perpetuating 
this worldview. The use of assessment to ascertain RFT can be seen to function 
as a technology of power, constructing ‘readiness’ as a variable to be 
measured, locating ‘pathology’ and responsibility to change in the individual, 
whilst positioning significant power with the clinician as a gatekeeper for access 
to therapy as a resource, and constructing the patient as ‘ready’ or ‘unready’ 
workable-with or not. 
 
1.5.3 Narrative Approaches 
Often considered to be a postmodernist approach, narrative therapy can be 
seen to challenge the psy-profession’s capacity to define reality, instead 
focusing on language and its role in the construction and experience of the self. 
The positioning of power within the therapeutic relationship is shifted away from 
therapist as expert and toward a co-construction of meanings of experiences, 
reality and the person’s subjective experience of self-concept (Boston, 2000). 
Narrative constructions of RFT are conceptualised as a deconstruction: a move 
away from the focus on pathology in assessment and from the assumption that 
there is something ‘wrong’ with the client. The ‘intake interview’ (as opposed to 
‘assessment’) is viewed as an “excavation” of the often problem-saturated 
dominant story and of the implicit construction of the client as “fused” with their 
problem (Timm, 2014). 
 
In inpatient settings the use of open dialogue (Seikkula, Aaltonen, Alakare, 
Haarakangas, Keranen, & Sutela 1995), an intervention grounded in narrative 
and systemic approaches, is in an ongoing process of development with striking 
success rates for those experiencing psychosis: 81% compared with 20% in 
treatment as usual (Stickman, 2015). Focused on curiosity and improvisation 
and involving a consistent family/social network approach to care, the 
‘polyphony’ described in open dialogue, whereby all voices are heard and given 
equal weight (Stockman, 2015), places a different emphasis on decisions about 
RFT.  
 
Additionally, the recent publication of the Power Threat Meaning (PTM) 
Framework (Johnstone & Boyle, 2018) could be seen to be aligned to narrative 
approaches. It outlines a conceptual alternative to the diagnostic model of 
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mental distress bringing together evidence about the role of power, the 
evolution of threat responses, social discourses and personal meanings and 
narratives.1 
In order to understand how the construction of ‘RFT’ is functioning within adult 
acute inpatient services it is important to appreciate how it has been 
constructed over time and in relation to differing theoretical approaches. This 
study will therefore employ a Foucauldian-informed approach to the literature 
review, interrogating the “conditions of possibility” (Foucault, 1966) in which 
RFT is currently conceptualized and the resultant implications for subjectivity 
both of the ‘ready’ therapeutic subject and of the clinicians who ‘assess’ them. 
There follows a literature review which seeks to critically analyse the literature 
surrounding RFT, examining discursive constructions from a Foucauldian 
perspective.  
 
1.6 Literature Search 
 
A systematic search was completed using PSYCHINFO and Science Direct 
databases. The search terms were refined through ‘abstract, title, keywords’ in 
Science Direct and ‘title’ and ‘subjects’ within PSYCHINFO. After carrying out 
an initial screening of the title and abstracts of the literature generated, research 
that appeared relevant to this study was selected. A citation search was also 
performed.  For the purposes of this study searches were restricted to topics 
directly referencing mental health concerns. The terms chosen for the advanced 
searches were aligned to my research questions and are detailed below: 
 
• (Readiness OR Preparedness) AND (Therap* OR Treatment OR 
Psychotherap* OR Psycholog*) 
• (Readiness OR Preparedness) AND Change 
• Motivation AND (Therap* OR Treatment OR Psychotherap* OR 
Psycholog*) 
• Insight AND (Therap* OR Treatment OR Psychotherap* OR Psycholog*) 
• (Therap* OR Treatment OR Psychotherap* OR Psycholog*) 
• AND Psychological-Mindedness 
                                                          
1 See Appendix A for an overview of the PTM Framework. 
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• (Readiness OR Preparedness) AND Therap* AND Inpatient AND 
Psychiatr* 
 
 
1.7 Constructions of Readiness for Therapy 
 
This literature review aims to explicate the discursive shifts which have 
influenced how RFT is currently constructed in relation to theoretical and 
therapeutic models and to norms of practice. In his studies of scientific 
discourses Foucault analysed the ways in which language forms an ontological 
order of things implicit in scientific theories and practices. The ‘linguistic turn’ or 
‘turn to discourse’ (Parker, 1989) opened the way for new possibilities for 
thinking with language seen as constitutive, rather than simply expressive, of 
our experiences of the world; and, additionally, considering how language is 
deployed in professional contexts in both theory and practice. The language 
used to construct the concept of RFT has, as might be expected, shifted and 
transformed over time. It covers multiple terms and definitions including, but not 
limited to: RFT, psychological-mindedness, engagement, insight, readiness for 
change, suitability, and motivation. Language in the literature appears to contain 
multiple potential meanings relating to each term as well as elements which 
feed into one another, with operational definitions varying so widely within each 
term as to make research results challenging to summarize. For the purposes of 
this review, literature relating to each conceptually and linguistically differing 
area of RTF will be addressed in broadly chronological order, this is intended to 
highlight the complexity and overlap of these constrcutions as they emerged 
over time. Table 1 highlights, where applicable, how each area of RFT relates to 
the constructions of therapy outlined in section 1.5. 2 Through examination of 
shifts in how RFT has been constructed in the literature, this review seeks to 
demonstrate the constructed nature of RFT and the resultant implications for 
subjectivity. 
Crucially RFT as an ontological reality is not questioned in the literature. It is 
thus enabled as a site of clinical assessment, linked to outcome and inherent in 
decisions of ‘suitability’ for, and therefore access to, therapy services.  
 
                                                          
2  See Appendix B 
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Themes running throughout the literature can be seen to revolve around 
personality and demographic variables, psychological attributes and an 
awareness of and amenability to the clinical conventions of therapy. These shall 
be elucidated in more detail below 
 
 
As a clarifying point: the language used in this thesis constructing the 
phenomenon being analysed  as ‘readiness for therapy’ is, as mentioned in 
section 1.1, a pragmatic choice of a phrase that is regularly used in clinical 
practice and one which would be easily understandable to participants as a 
naturally occurring part of their working language. In examining RFT in the 
literature review, the initial section – 1.7.1 below will address RFT as 
represented in the literature. The subsequent discussion, in sections 1.7.2 – 
1.7.6, should not be seen as subsidiary sections to 1.7.1: they are alternative 
linguistic and conceptual constructions of the construct of RFT present in the 
literature and will be examined in turn.  
 
1.7.1 Readiness for Therapy 
As discussed, RFT is an ambiguous, multifactorial construct.  
Early literature addressing RFT is primarily psychoanalytic in focus. For 
example, Hoffman (1969) contends that an individual’s defence mechanisms, 
activated due to the stress inherent in therapy, will predict who is likely to 
remain in or drop out of therapy: denial, and repression being linked to the 
unready client and projection and isolation to the ready client (Hoffman, 1969, p. 
545). Here the reified use of psychoanalytic constructs can be seen to construct 
or classify the ‘ready’ or ‘unready’ subject via their defence mechanisms. 
Therapy itself is constructed as inherently ‘stressful’, a way of working into 
which the patient must fit.  
 
Assessment of personality aspects is recommended to ascertain RFT (Ryan, 
2001). Shanan and Moses (1961) note a preference to offer therapy to 
“neurotics, persons with personality disorders, and persons without a diagnosis 
as compared to psychotics and organics” (p. 203) and that the offer of therapy 
is highly correlated with the applicants’ readiness to locate the problems within 
themselves (Shanan and Moses, 1961). Frank, Gliedman, Imber, Nash and 
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Stone (1956) emphasize attributes including: class, education, occupation, 
readiness to communicate distress and personal liabilities, influenceability, 
perseverance and social integrity (Frank et al, 1956). The Counseling 
Readiness Scale (CRS) (Heilbrun & Sullivan, 1962) evaluates RFT through 
separate scales for men and women. Demographics, intellectual and 
personality variables are considered, finding that the unready (or prematurely 
terminating) client has lower socioeconomic status, is male, older, less 
educated, and less intelligent than the ready (or continuing) client. Personality 
variables are also emphasized including “verbal productivity, persistence, 
suggestibility, dependency, ability to deal with feelings and to specify problem 
areas, and level of personality integration” (p. 31).  All three of these studies, 
within the parameters of the biomedical model, can be seen to contain 
assumptions of individualism, paying scant attention to the part of context or 
social factors.  
 
 Ogrodniczuk, Joyce and Piper (2009) define readiness as “a positive attitude 
and preparedness to enter into a therapeutic relationship for the purpose of 
resolving problems”. It is the focus of “patient selection…a critical task for all 
psychotherapists” (p 426). Numerous elements of RFT have been proposed in 
the literature: desire to change (Truant, 1999), readiness to make sacrifices 
(Hacker, 1962), willingness to talk about personal matters openly (Krause, 
1966), level of distress (Schneider & Klauer, 2001; Derisley & Reynolds, 2000; 
Moore, Tambling & Anderson, 2013) and lack of autonomy (Pelletier et al, 
1996).  
 
Despite more recent meta-analytic findings highlighting uncertainty and 
discrepancies surrounding the question of relationship between demographic 
and personality related variables and readiness (Wierzbicki & Pekarik, 1993; 
Swift & Greenberg, 2015), more recent literature on readiness continues to 
emphasize personality variables and psychological factors (Fuller, 2013) 
including: proneness for subjective level of discomfort, capacity for insight, 
motivation and willingness to forgive (Ryan, 2001). The Readiness for 
Psychotherapy Index (RPI)  (Ogrodniczuk et al, 2009), a self-report 
assessment, measures readiness via seven dimensions of RFT: level of 
distress, desire for change, willingness to work in therapy, recognition of 
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problems as psychological, willingness to discuss personal matters, willingness 
to endure discomfort in therapy and responsibility for change (Ogrodniczuk et 
al, 2009). In contrast to the CRS readiness is viewed not as a character trait but 
as a state that is amenable to change, raising questions (addressed in further 
detail in section 1.7.3) about whether criteria of RFT can be seen as 
prerequisite or goal.  
 
All these approaches to defining and assessing RFT locate the difficulty within 
the individual and give little regard to the role of context.  In this way we can 
understand these approaches as positioned in line with a normalising3 agenda 
in the construction of a therapeutic subject with the personal resources to fulfil 
these criteria in order to be considered ready for therapy.  As with all of the 
scales and measures assessing readiness, the power to assess the patient is 
positioned with the clinician. Additionally it is noteworthy that the creation of 
assessment tools is constructed within a discourse of ‘evidence-base’ which 
endeavours to account for consistency and validity of factors. Many of the 
processes of development of such scales rely on the examination of items by 
“highly experienced clinicians” (Ogrodniczuk et al, 2009) enabling a construction 
of the clinician as ‘expert’ and positioning the discursive power to construct RFT 
away from the patient in the power-knowledge nexus.  
 
1.7.2 Suitability 
Truant’s two studies on the assessment of ‘suitability’ for psychotherapy 
(Truant, 1998, 1999) address many of the same themes as the literature on 
RFT. He highlights the need for detailed assessments to ascertain suitability for 
psychotherapy based on numerous criteria including:  
▪ Capacity to form a productive working relationship, containing variables 
including: motivation, quality of the therapeutic alliance, the patient’s 
relational history, constructed through the lens of their object relations 
(Klein, 1952), as indicative of suitability  
▪  “Supportive life circumstances” to include time, appropriate finances, 
work support and family support. 
▪ “Previous positive relationships with parents, teachers, bosses and 
therapists” (Truant, 1999, p. 21).  
                                                          
3 See section 2.5.2.3 for a detailed description of Foucault’s concept of normalisation 
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▪ “Patient model factors” are considered including: introspection, 
psychological-mindedness and acceptance of patterns as maladaptive. 
▪ Willingness to align to the conventions of therapeutic interventions by 
demonstrating a positive response to “trial interventions”: for example 
having “modifiable defenses” and a good response to “transference 
interventions” or, in CBT, testing the accessibility of automatic thoughts 
and the awareness and differentiation of emotions (1999). 
 
High expectations are thus placed on this ‘ready’ subject - the ‘suitable’ patient. 
Truant’s description of “patient model factors” mirror those of psychological-
mindedness and insight (explored in more detail below). Processes of 
subjectification here construct a subject who is willing to align themselves to 
therapeutic conventions and knowledge. David’s (1990) observation that insight 
in psychoanalysis became “synonymous with the willingness of a person to 
agree with Freudian theory” (p. 211) seems apt here. 
 
1.7.3 Psychological Mindedness  
One of the first terms to be used in this area, and originating in the literature of 
psychoanalytically-informed approaches, psychological mindedness (PM) has 
been referred to as a prerequisite for therapeutic engagement. First defined by 
Appelbaum (1963) as “a person’s ability to see relationships among thoughts, 
feelings and actions, with the goal of learning the meanings and causes of his 
experiences and behaviours” (p 35) this construct appears to contain elements 
which are cognitive, affective and motivational. It is described as the process, 
with ‘insight’ as the product (Appelbaum, 1973 ). As Hall (1992) points out, the 
term has historically lacked precision and is often used interchangeably with 
differing terms including insight, introspection and self-awareness (Hall, 1992).  
Conte et al (1990) define PM as being implicitly linked both to a willingness to 
commit to the therapeutic alliance and to a fundamental agreement with the 
values and norms inherent in psychotherapy (Conte et al, 1990). This requires 
the patient to agree to construct their difficulties within the discursive 
frameworks of whichever therapeutic approach may be being used to assess 
PM or RFT. Bourdieu’s concept of cultural capital (1986) can be seen here to 
encompass these requirements, in the expectation for the patient to display an 
understanding of the clinician’s constructions and theories of the world, with the 
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inherent implications for subjectivity. Deployment of clinically recognisable 
language, ideologies and actions thus facilitates access to a culture or group 
(Bourdieu, 1986) in this case access to therapeutic provision.  
 
Ryan and Cicchetti (1985) position PM as one pre-therapy patient variable 
predictive of quality of the therapeutic alliance, of which other variables include: 
good object relations, hope for success, psychic pain and intrapsychic flexibility 
(Ryan and Cicchetti, 1985) and whilst many constructions of PM view it as a 
prerequisite for therapeutic engagement, it is also constructed as something 
which can be improved or developed by psychotherapy, which can enhance 
insight into psychological states and processes through introspection and self-
monitoring (Nykličel,Majoor & Schalken, 2010).  Again through processes of 
subjectification we can observe the construction of a self-monitoring, self-
regulating, ‘ready’ subject via the internalization of the norms of therapy - 
namely introspection and self-monitoring.  
 
Other definitions link PM directly to therapeutic suitability with Baekeland and 
Lundwall (1975) stating that PM “implies the patient’s ability to recognise and 
admit psychological and interpersonal problems, to see himself in psychological 
terms, to use or to accept the use of psychological constructs, or to at least 
imagine psychological causes of his symptoms and behaviours” (p. 655). Some 
have constructed PM as relating to suitability for treatment relating to how much 
patients saw their symptoms as psychological in nature and valued 
psychological well-being (Rosenbaum and Horowitz, 1983). The Psychological 
Mindedness Assessment Procedure (PMAP), for example, is a measure which 
aims to assess the abilities required within analytically-oriented therapies 
(McCallum & Piper, 1990). PM is operationalized here as receptivity on the part 
of the patient, to develop insight that their difficulties are manifestations of 
unconscious psychic conflicts. Here internalising of the dominant knowledges of 
the psy-professional results in a self-disciplining subject who accepts the use of 
psychological constructs thus allowing difficulties to be understood within an 
individualising agenda.  
 
PM has, more recently, been theorized as relating to cognitive functioning in the 
areas of “cognitive flexibility, sense of personal agency and inclination towards 
25 
 
realistic thinking” (Beitel, Ferrer and Cecero, 2004). The Balanced Index of 
Psychological Mindedness (Nykličel and Denollet, 2009), developed on both 
community and mental health patient samples, found that PM was higher in 
women than men, that it was lower in “poorly educated” people and “mental 
health patients” and that ‘insight’ was negatively correlated with symptoms of 
psychological distress (Nykličel and Denollet, 2009). These constructions 
overlap with the ideas mentioned in section 1.7.1 in which RFT is constructed 
along lines of class, education, and gender. The addition of “mental health 
patients” to the list of those who display low PM, constructed as a prerequisite 
for therapy, raises questions in relation to who therapy is for?  
 
1.7.4 Insight 
Insight, constructed as a ‘product’ of PM, is linked in the literature to psychosis 
and schizophrenia. Lack of insight into illness is listed as a characteristic feature 
of schizophrenia (Poletti et al, 2012), one which has a notable influence on 
treatment compliance and clinical outcome (Smith et al., 1999; Kamali et al., 
2001). The principal themes emerging from scales and measures assessing 
insight in people presenting with psychosis4 broadly reflect constructions of 
insight described in the literature: acceptance of mental illness, compliance with 
prescribed treatment and ‘correct’ labelling of unusual experiences as 
pathological (David,1990). Amador and Kronengold (2004) propose that insight 
on the part of the patient includes: awareness of having a mental disorder, 
awareness of symptoms and attribution of these symptoms to the mental 
disorder, awareness of the consequences of having the disorder and, thus, the 
need for treatment. As Moynihan (2015) summarises: these definitions 
comprise similar ideas around “concordance with the clinician, compliance with 
treatment, and constitution of self and experience as pathological” (p. 8). Beck-
Sander (1998) dismantles insight as a fundamentally flawed concept, 
highlighting assumptions around correlations between insight and: diagnostic 
significance, treatment compliance, psychological well-being, prognosis and 
pathophysiology (Carpenter, Bartko, Carpenter & Strauss, 1976; Amador, 
Strauss, Yale & Gorman, 1991). She highlights the potential impact of 
‘promoting insight’ on the self-identity of the patient resulting in ‘engulfment’ 
                                                          
4 See Appendix C 
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(Lally, 1989) in which the patient’s identity is reorganized around the devalued 
role of the psychotic patient (Beck-Sander, 1998).  
 
Cognitive constructions of insight centre around the cognitive processes 
involved in patients’ re-evaluation of their unusual experiences and of “their 
specific misinterpretations: distancing, objectivity, perspective and self-
correction” (Beck, Baruch, Balter, Steer & Warman, 2004) with the Beck 
Cognitive Insight Scale (BCIS) evaluating “self-reflectiveness” and 
“overconfidence of their interpretations” on the part of the patient and 
suggesting further identification and correction of inaccurate beliefs and 
misinterpretations. Literature in this area also constructs insight as being linked 
to the cognitive impairment that affects 85% of people with schizophrenia 
(Medalia & Lim, 2004). The construction of cognitive impairment in 
schizophrenia as a result of the disorder is based on an assumption that it is 
disease processes which cause the impairment as opposed to other factors 
such as side effects of medication and the idea of ‘chemical restraint’ 
(Moncrieff, 2011).  
 
1.7.5 Readiness for Change  
Following the development of the Stages of Change (SOC) model, informally 
referred to as “readiness for change” and described by the Transtheoretical 
Model of Change (TTM) (Prochaska and DiClementi, 1992), research into RFT 
has been flooded with studies employing this framework. The TTM proposes 
that a particular treatment would be effective only when matched to an 
individual’s current stage of change (Hilburger and Lam, 1999). Stages of 
change (SOC) occur in a series of stages including: precontemplation, 
contemplation, action, and maintenance (Prochaska and DiClemente, 1982). 
SOC and the TTM, frequently used in conjunction with motivational interviewing 
(MI) (Miller and Rollnick, 1991), are applied in a plethora of clinical settings and 
populations including substance misuse (Abellanas & McLellan 1993; Brown, 
Melchior, Panter, Slaughter, & Huba, 2000), health promotion (Duncan and 
Cribb, 1996) and offending behaviour (Casey, Day & Howells, 2005). As 
explicated by Casey et al (2005): the TTM has, over the past twenty years, 
become the most widely used model of behaviour change in the treatment of 
addictive and/or problem behaviours.  
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Whilst it is not possible within the constraints of the current study to provide an 
in-depth examination of how SOC and TTM are constructed it is important to 
note that TTM can be seen to express powerful norms about what is good or 
bad, healthy or unhealthy, acceptable or unacceptable behaviour (Duncan and 
Cribb, 1996). It could be argued that these approaches represent technologies 
of power (Foucault, 1968) implicit in the construction of a neoliberal subject 
through processes such as MI, which is used to understand the client’s 
perspective but also to “strategically elicit language that promotes greater 
commitment to change from a client” (Muscat, 2005). Indeed, these models of 
readiness appear to provide almost a crossroads between psychological 
approaches, problematic behaviours and ‘coercive’ treatments in forensic 
psychiatry and the criminal justice system (Day, Tucker & Howells, 2004). For 
psychologists using interventions with the aim of reducing criminal recidivism 
risk, for example, MI has been employed to shift offenders towards a “prosocial” 
lifestyle, enabling prisoners to increase their readiness to change “by an 
average of one stage” (Anstiss, Polaschek & Wilson, 2011). Here processes of 
governmentality5 can be seen in operation, as the power of the state is 
transmuted and supported through patterns of power-knowledge relations in the 
human sciences - in this case psychiatry and psychology – through their claims 
to expert knowledge. The power to define ‘normality’ and construct a ‘prosocial’ 
subject who is ready to change thus transforming unstable power relations via 
disciplinary technologies and self-regulatory patterns of subjectification.  
 
1.7.6 Motivation  
Motivation is also acknowledged to be an ambiguous concept (Drieschner, 
Lammers & van der Staak, 2004). Conceptually it is closely linked in the 
literature to both RFT and Stages of Change (SOC) and the Transtheoretical 
Model (TTM). As Krause (1966) highlights, a patient’s motivation is a central 
factor in outcome of treatment because the psychotherapy patient “does not 
merely receive treatment but must actively participate in it” (p. 9). Early 
measures of motivation assess the patient’s acceptance of the patient role, 
compliance with treatment and readiness to openly discuss personal matters 
                                                          
5 See section 2.5.2.2 for a detailed description of Foucault’s concept of governmentality. 
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(Krause, 1967). Foucault’s concept of disciplinary power6 (Foucault, 1966) is 
prescient here; namely the potential to induce a self-disciplining state in the 
patient through continuous observation and assessment. Processes of self-
regulation and disciplinary practices thus function to construct the ready patient 
as a neoliberal subject who will internalise the norms of therapy. Other 
motivation scales address criteria such as: curiosity to understand oneself, 
desire to change, preparedness to make reasonable sacrifices, introspection 
and degree of autonomy (Keithly, Samples & Strupp, 1980; Kernberg et al, 
1972; Sifneos, 1975). However, many of these criteria can be seen to be 
conflated with psychological well-functioning (Rosenbaum and Horowitz, 1983). 
Duivenvoorden (1982) demonstrated that patients considered to be motivated 
by their therapists were more attractive, more verbally-oriented and more 
insight-oriented than those who were assessed as unmotivated 
(Duivenvoorden, as cited in Dreischner et al, 2004). The construction of 
motivation as implicitly linked to the exclusion of less intelligent, less 
introspective or less well patients is significant in relation to how constructions 
of motivation or RFT may be functioning within processes of subjectification of 
an idealised ‘ready’ or ‘motivated’ therapeutic subject. Dreischner et al (2004) 
emphasise the difficulty caused by circular definitions of motivation (and related 
concepts), which is “inferred from the very behaviour it is assumed to predict” 
(p. 1119), highlighting the potential for pejorative attitudes to stem from 
definitions which infer motivation from behaviour; the implication being that non-
engagement in treatment is seen as unwillingness of the part of the patient. 
“Psychotherapy thus is still, for some, the business in which the customer is 
always wrong. ‘Insufficient treatment motivation’ is the convenient accusation 
which conjures up ghosts of insufficient moral fiber, of weak will power, or 
incorrigible badness” (Hacker, 1962).  
 
Motivation and RFT are both also linked in the literature with level of distress. 
This association functions in two ways: firstly through incongruence between 
the expectations of the patient and the expectations of the therapist and/or 
referrer which may be a source of distress (O’Hare, 1996) and secondly, 
whereby the patient is thought to have increased levels of motivation or 
                                                          
6 See section 2.5.2.1 for a detailed description of Foucault’s concept of disciplinary power. 
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readiness for change if they are experiencing high levels of distress in their 
current situation (Moore, Tambling & Anderson, 2013). With the reduction in 
psychiatric bed numbers leading to an increased level of crisis and distress 
required to meet thresholds for admission, it could be assumed that patients in 
these settings show increased ‘motivation’ or ‘readiness’ for therapy. However, 
high levels of distress are positioned in the literature as being both associated 
with increased motivation, as highlighted above, and as associated with 
decreased motivation (Knerr et al, 2011).  High levels of distress are thus 
constructed as both necessary for RFT and as a hindrance.  
 
1.7.7 Engagement  
Frequently discussed in clinical settings, and often used synonymously with the 
idea of RFT, Tetley, Jinks, Huband & Howells (2011) found that “engagement” 
(and “disengagement”) are poorly defined and frequently conflated with 
concepts of treatment readiness, treatment motivation, and the ‘working 
alliance’. They suggest that readiness variables such as attitudes to treatment 
are likely to predict ‘engagement’, which they state refers to “the extent to which 
the client actively participates in the treatment on offer” (p 928). Highlighting that 
premature termination of therapy has been estimated to be as high as 82% 
(Ben-Porath, 2004; McMurran, Huband & Overton, 2010; Wierzliki & Pekarik, 
1993) Tetley et al (2011) link low engagement in therapy to premature 
termination, affecting outcomes, causing services to become cost-ineffective 
and demoralizing staff (O’Brien, Fahmy and Singh, 2009). As we can see, 
engagement articulates an economic discourse relating to the impact of low 
engagement (or unreadiness for therapy) on outcomes and cost-efficiencies. 
Engagement, or RFT, is constructed here as an ontological reality, able to 
predict outcome within a realist biomedical framework. Scientific knowledge is 
privileged and deployed within the power-knowledge nexus to construct a form 
of ‘best practice’ in line with economic and biomedical discourses The clinician 
is thus required to construct themselves, through processes of subjectification, 
as aligned to clinical guidance and functioning within a ‘scientist practitioner’ 
model (Stoltenberg & Pace, 2007) to enable evidence-based interventions with 
demonstrable outcomes, a discursive transformation linked to economic and 
efficiency agendas.  
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Tetley et al (2011) suggest the measures of treatment engagement should 
assess: attendance at requisite sessions, completion of treatment, completion 
of between-session tasks (where appropriate), contribution to therapy sessions, 
to include “self-disclosure and/or other tasks or activities”, and appropriate 
working alliance with the therapist. Again we can see here processes of 
subjectification constructing the ‘engaged’ subject in a similar way to the 
‘psychologically-minded’ subject as one who is compliant with treatment. Again 
the assessment of willingness or ability to ‘self-disclose’ can be seen as 
deploying the technology of the confessional (Foucault, 1982). The requirement 
for a neoliberal, self-regulating subject who is able to continue to work and be 
productive creates subject positions in which individuals are compelled to 
conform. Interestingly “vocational performance” has been employed as an 
outcome measure of psychiatric rehabilitation (Ferdinandi, Yoottanasumpun, 
Pollack & Bermanzohn, 1998) whilst the development of IAPT (Increasing 
Access to Psychological Therapies) can be seen to be imbued with functions of 
governmentality through its overt link to economic outcomes.  
 
In literature relating to mental health, persons with serious mental illness (SMI) 
“particularly schizophrenia” are constructed as “often difficult to engage” 
(Mueser, Bond, Drake & Resnick, 1998; Sainsbury Centre for Mental Health, 2001; 
Tait, Birchwood & Trower, 2002) with reasons being located in the person: 
“many are suspicious of statutory services because of their upbringing, life 
experiences or attitudes” (Sainsbury Centre for Mental Health, 2001, p.8), 
disregarding potentially coercive and abusive practices which the individual may 
have experienced from statutory services. 
By constructing those with SMI as “difficult to engage” (or not ready for therapy) 
dominant discourses within the research have the potential to create barriers to 
this group accessing therapy as a resource. The absence of literature on RFT in 
inpatient settings, as we shall see in the following sections, demonstrates this 
exclusion of the non-conforming or ‘unready’ subject on a conceptual level.  
 
1.7.8 Summary: Readiness for Therapy and Assessment  
The assessment of RFT can be considered to be a technology of power in 
which both patient and clinician are constructed through processes of 
subjectification. The clinician is subject to professional discourses of evidence-
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base, measurement and efficacy relating to broader economic discourses of 
governmentality. The therapeutic subject can likewise be constructed in differing 
subjectivities: patient, client, survivor according to the deployment of expert 
language, and overwhelmingly within a ‘discourse of deficit’ (Gergen, 1997). 
Subjectification within the assessment process can have implications for access 
to therapy, for example, the requirement to adhere to clinical conventions of 
differing therapeutic modalities in the patient’s understanding and 
communication of their distress or else risk being labelled ‘not ready’. 
Assessment of RFT can therefore be considered to be a technology of power in 
creating or limiting subject positions available through the discursive 
deployment of ‘regimes of truth’ (Foucault, 1965) via power-knowledge 
relations. The clinician, functioning within a realist biomedical model, thus has 
the power to define: ‘readiness’ as an object to be assessed, the therapeutic 
subject within the role of ‘patient’, what constitutes the ‘ready’ therapeutic 
subject and thus who can gain access to therapy. 
 
1.8 Readiness for Therapy in in Adult Acute Inpatient Settings 
 
The discussion of readiness for therapy is particularly pertinent in inpatient 
settings. As noted by Durrant et al (2007) “a frequent complaint by service-
users of psychiatric in-patient units is the unavailability of talking therapy at 
precisely the time when they need to make sense of their situation”. (p. 117). 
 
1.8.1 Therapy in Inpatient Settings: Availability and Access 
National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) guidance 
recommending at least one psychological intervention per week for inpatients 
(National Institute for Health and Care Excellence, 2014), Accreditation for 
Inpatient Mental Health Services (AIMS) recommends “Inpatients have access 
to specialist practitioners of psychological interventions for one half-day (four 
hours) per week per ward” (37.4) and that “At least one staff member linked to 
the ward is delivering two or more problem- specific, high intensity 
psychological interventions (to correspond to two or more diagnostic criteria as 
per NICE guidance)” (38.8) (Accreditation for Inpatient Mental Health Services, 
2010). However, Bowers et al (2006) found that 87 per cent of acute mental 
health wards in England had no dedicated clinical psychologist. A survey by the 
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Sainsbury Centre for Mental Health found that fewer than 20% of ward 
managers reported their ward having access to CBT (Sainsbury Centre for 
Mental Health, 2005). However, as pointed out in British Psychological Society 
(BPS) guidelines, the number of those who actually receive CBT is a fraction of 
this 20%, which accounts for ‘access to’, not ‘delivery of’ therapies (British 
Psychological Society, 2012). The NICE guidance updates for schizophrenia 
(2014) and depression (2009b & 2018) also highlight that psychological 
interventions can be started during the acute phase or after a period of crisis 
provided the intervention can be completed notwithstanding discharge or 
transfer (British Psychological Society, 2012).  As discussed, due to the 
decreases in psychiatric bed numbers those admitted are likely to be in an 
increased level of crisis, having met the higher threshold for admission, 
suggesting that “NHS psychiatric hospitals are increasingly used to care for and 
contain people who are seriously mentally ill and who are considered to pose a 
risk to themselves or others.” (Mental Health Bulletin, 2011b).  Bowers et al 
(2005) highlight that acute inpatient care is now used by those who are most 
vulnerable and seriously ill , with, inpatient environments shifting towards more 
a custodial function and most acute wards locked (Care Quality Commission, 
2010). Papoulias, Csipke, Rose , McKellar and  Wykes (2014) examine the 
current emphasis on the ward as a temporary place for containing and 
stabilizing, questioning whether it can be a therapeutic space (Papoulias et al, 
2014), whilst Bowers (2005) highlights broad questions about the function and 
purpose of acute psychiatric wards, indicating a lack of clarity and agreement 
on what inpatient care is for (Bowers et al., 2005). Profound differentiation in 
access to psychological therapies remains, with, for example, women being 
more likely to access psychological therapy than men (Nam et al., 2010) and 
black and minority ethnic groups much less likely to be referred to psychological 
therapies (Mind, 2013). Furthermore, due to the nature of being in an enclosed 
environment the client has less autonomy and no recourse to alternative 
resources to those offered on the ward (Warner, Mariathasan, Lawton-Smith & 
Samele, 2006), for example attending hearing voices network meetings. 
Differences in power relationships in this environment also have an impact on 
the construction of RFT given that the clinician has more power and control over 
the patient’s life than at any other point in mental health services (Laugharne, 
Priebe, McCabe, Garland and Clifford, 2012). Decisions concerning RFT are 
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made on multiple levels: by referrer by psychologist at assessment, on an 
institutional level through choices about provision and type of psychological 
therapies made available or through decisions made at a research and policy 
level. There follows a discussion of the literature concerning RFT in adult 
inpatient settings.  
 
1.8.2 Literature on Readiness for Therapy in Adult Inpatient Settings 
Within the literature searches for RFT in adult inpatient settings the search 
terms: 
(Readiness OR Preparedness) AND Therap* AND Inpatient AND Psychiatr*, 
returned fifty articles. The majority of these articles concerned SOC and TTM, 
and applied to only those patients with a ‘dual diagnosis’ (psychiatric disorder 
and substance misuse). None were found which address RFT in relation to non-
comorbid mental health difficulties.  Interestingly the vast majority of this 
literature on RFT (or SOC) and ‘dual diagnosis’ in inpatient settings relates to 
psychosis and schizophrenia rather than any affective or personality disorders. 
A restriction of the search terms to exclude these dually-diagnosed populations: 
(Readiness OR Preparedness) AND Therap* AND Inpatient AND Psychiatr* 
NOT Substance NOT Addict*, and filtered to include only adult populations, 
returned 19 articles of which 18 were screened to be of low relevance to the 
present research. The one relevant article: Fuller’s (2013) study on 
psychological readiness, concerned group therapies across inpatient and 
outpatient settings, an area which is outside the parameters of the current 
study. The following discussion will therefore address hypothesized reasons for 
the absence of literature in this area before continuing to outline the rationale for 
the present study.  
 
As discussed in section 1.4, there are multiple problems faced by and in current 
acute inpatient psychiatric care in the UK. In addition to the difficulties already 
outlined, the literature records: deficits in leadership, risk management and 
clinical skills (Standing Nursing and Midwifery Advisory Committee (1999) ; high 
levels of crisis-centred care and chaos (Sainsbury Centre for Mental Health, & 
Seymour, 1998). and un-therapeutic conditions, overworked staff and a climate 
of fear (MIND, 2004). Walton’s (2000) study found a lack of therapeutic direction 
on acute wards with minimal activities provided, a medication-centred view of 
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care coupled with an avoidance of social factors in the diagnosis of mental 
disorders and lack of attention to patients’ civil rights (Walton, 2000). Bowers et 
al (2005) argue that the longstanding focus on community care has led to a drift 
in acute inpatient care both on a policy and research level. However, inpatient 
beds are still a necessary part of service structures and as pointed out, no 
service has been able to manage without them completely (Bowers et al, 2005).  
The intersection between lack of research, lack of policy focus, medicalised 
approaches to ‘treatment’ and a shortage of therapeutic provision therefore 
appears to be integral to the dearth of literature on RFT in these settings.  
 
1.9 Rationale 
 
This literature review has briefly considered the multifarious discursive 
constructions of RFT. Investigations into RFT appear in many different guises, 
broadly privileging an individualised understanding of distress in adherence to 
biomedical understandings of mental illness. However, yet to be explored is the 
way this concept is constructed. This thesis therefore adopted a critical realist 
social constructionist7 stance in order to enable consideration of phenomena as 
constructed in talk and of implications for the material realities impacted by 
these constructions, including lack of provision of, or access to, therapy. 
 
As clinical psychology aims to reduce psychological distress and to enhance 
and promote psychological wellbeing (British Psychological Society, 2010) it is 
important for clinical psychologists to be aware of the potential impact of 
professional discourses. Clinical discourses which label someone as ‘ready’, or 
not, for therapy, have the capacity to position differentiation in access as 
‘common sense’ rather than socially constructed, masking on-going inequalities 
created by service structures (Miller and McClelland, 2006). This is particularly 
relevant in inpatient services where there are already-noted problems around 
access and provision. RFT could therefore be seen as part of a power-
knowledge nexus which constructs a subject who must adhere to the 
individualised biomedical constructions of distress. 
 
                                                          
7 See section 2.3 
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Despite the dearth of literature on RFT in acute inpatient settings, it is clear that 
therapy does take place in these settings and that decisions about RFT will be 
made as part of the allocation of therapeutic resources. With these issues in 
mind this research seeks to address how RFT is being discursively constructed 
in adult inpatient settings, how it is functioning, and what the implications of 
these constructions are for provision of and access to therapy. By undertaking 
an analysis of the professional discourses of both clinical psychologists’ and 
psychiatrists’ constructions of RFT this study intends therefore to investigate 
discourses that may impact both patients and professionals and the implications 
for practice and for the subjectivity of the patients who are, or are not, referred 
and assessed.  
 
A Foucauldian Discourse Analysis (FDA)8 will facilitate this study to explore 
RFT as a discursively constructed entity, functioning within socio-cultural norms, 
with implications for the subjectivities of both clinician and patient. A critical 
realist social constructionist approach such as FDA can thus map discursive 
practices and power-knowledge structures to enable an understanding of how 
RFT is rendered a problematic construct in inpatient settings. This research is 
therefore valuable as a means of ensuring clinical psychology is able to 
meaningfully support those in inpatient settings who may wish to access 
therapeutic support, shaping practice and access to therapy.  
 
1.10 Research Questions  
 
How do clinicians construct their understanding of the concept of readiness for 
therapy? 
 
How is the discourse around readiness for therapy functioning in inpatient 
services? 
 
How does the construct of ‘ready’ or ‘not ready’ position someone in relation to 
inequalities in access to therapy and what are the potential consequences? 
 
 
                                                          
8 See section 2.5 
36 
 
CHAPTER TWO: METHODOLOGY 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter will outline the epistemological position and theoretical perspective 
of the study and how these perspectives will be used to explore the research 
questions. A rationale for the chosen position will be provided, followed by a 
discussion of the methodological approach and method employed. The 
procedures employed are outlined including: data collection, transcription, 
recruitment and participant information. This section will also address processes 
of ethics, data collection, analysis and reflexivity.  
 
2.2 Methodological Rationale  
 
The study aims to explore how clinicians working in adult acute inpatient mental 
health settings, primarily clinical psychologists and psychiatrists, construct the 
concept of readiness for therapy (RFT) and the implications for practice around 
provision of and access to therapy. Investigations into readiness for therapy 
appear in the research literature in many different guises, principally explored 
through realist epistemological methods with mixed findings (cf. Ogrodniczuk et 
al, 2009; Truant, 1999; Krause, 1956; Ryan, 2001; Heilbrun & Sullivan, 1982; 
Fuller, 2013). Remaining unexplored however are the ways in which this 
concept is constructed and the implications of the potential impact of 
professional discourses. This study intends therefore to investigate discourses 
that may impact both patients and professionals. A qualitative, social 
constructionist approach was used in order to enable the study’s exploratory 
nature and to contribute to an alternative research base. Foucauldian Discourse 
Analysis was used to facilitate examination of how the subject is constituted 
through both discursive and non-discursive practices (Foucault, 1967).  
  
2.3 Epistemology 
 
As Harper (2011) points out, epistemological paradigms can be seen to lie on a 
continuum from realism to relativism.  A realist epistemological position pertains 
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to understanding the data as a reflection of a knowable reality, a phenomenon 
‘which exists independently of the researcher’s awareness of it’ (Willig, 2013). 
Phenomenological approaches consider that the objective world as ‘a product of 
human consciousness and its interpretative processes’ (McHoul and Grace, 
1993) they are therefore concerned with the subjective experience of the 
participant.  The epistemological position taken in this study: social 
constructionism, falls at the opposite end of the spectrum to realism and would 
challenge assumptions of universal knowledge.  
 
2.3.1 Social Constructionism 
This study will align itself with four key assumptions of social constructionism 
outlined by Gergen (1985): 
 
1. A critical stance to taken-for-granted knowledge 
2. Historical and cultural specificity in relation to understandings of the 
world 
3. Forms of knowledge are sustained over time not due to empirical validity 
but rather to the shift or stasis of social processes 
4. Descriptions and explanations of the world themselves comprise forms of 
social action 
 
Social constructionism is concerned with how knowledge is generated and 
views this generation as occurring primarily through social processes (Harper, 
2011). The social constructionist position suggests that multiple versions of 
‘truth’ are possible and does not privilege one version over another. Social 
constructionism does, however, consider how one version of truth can achieve 
a privileged position over others and suggests that ‘human experience, 
including perception, is mediated historically, culturally and linguistically’ (Willig, 
2013). Language is important in the context of social constructionist research 
because, according to Willig (1999), it enables investigation of how realities and 
knowledge are constructed; language, rather than merely describing the world, 
both constructs the world as we observe it and has material consequences 
(Burr, 2003).  The importance of language, and of historical and cultural 
mediations of experience and reality is central to the exploration, in this study, 
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of the way in which professionals construct their understandings of readiness 
for therapy. 
 
2.3.2 Critical Realism 
The study will take a critical-realist position. That is to say, a realist ontological 
stance, which assumes the existence of a material reality, but one which is 
epistemologically relativist in that it acknowledges that research data are not a 
direct reflection of ‘reality’ and are impacted by our context, such as our place in 
history, our culture and our gender, which will influence the way we talk about a 
subject and the categories we may apply. It could be claimed that social 
constructionist and critical realist positions are somewhat at odds with one 
another; this study, however, will align itself with the view of Sims-Schouten et 
al (2007) that ‘critical realism combines constructionist and realist positions [and 
that] while meaning is made in interaction, non-discursive elements may also 
impact on meaning’ (p.102). An analysis of how clinicians construct their 
understandings of readiness for therapy will therefore examine the constructive 
power of language and its embededness in everyday practices, whilst also 
allowing for the understanding of embodied and material non-discursive aspects 
of experience (Cromby and Nightingale, 1999). 
 
2.4 Methodology 
 
2.4.1 Discourse Analysis 
Discourse analysis as a methodology developed within the field of social 
psychology in the 1970s and 1980s.  Previous assumptions around discourse 
as a set of signs able to describe reality or label internal states, were challenged 
and language came to be seen as a social performance with productive 
potential (Willig, 2013). According to Georgaca and Avdi (2011) discourses are 
“systems of meaning that are related to the interactional and wider socio-
cultural context and operate regardless of the speakers’ intentions” (p. 147). 
Parker (1992) further elucidates discourse as a “system of statements which 
constructs an object” (p.5). There are two principal approaches to discourse 
analysis: discursive psychology (cf. Potter and Wetherell, 1995) and 
Foucauldian Discourse Analysis (FDA). This study will utilise FDA due to its 
focus on the constructive power of language and emphasis on the mediation of 
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power relations through discourse (Burr, 2003). The attention given in FDA to 
historical inquiry, power, and processes of subjectification is felt to be 
particularly apposite for the foci of analysis in psychological research (Arribas-
Ayllon & Walkerdine, 2008). FDA also recognises that, in a social world, 
different constructions can result in different social power (Harper & Spellman, 
2006). 
 
2.5 Method 
 
Informed by the thinking of Michel Foucault, FDA will be used to explore how 
subjects and objects are constructed through discourses and the discursive 
resources that are made available within a culture (Parker, 1992).  
 
2.5.1 Foucauldian Discourse Analysis 
Foucault’s thinking around the ‘history of systems of thought’ can be seen to 
centre around three principal concepts: power, knowledge and discourse. In all 
three of these concepts Foucault moved beyond structuralist views and it is this 
post-structuralist theorizing upon which this research draws: instead of seeking 
to uncover the ‘real’ structures underpinning certain events or historical 
material; or taking the phenomenological view that ‘reality’ is constructed by 
human consciousness and our interpretations, Foucault could be seen to ‘go 
outside’ these forms of thinking (McHoul and Grace, 1993). 
 
In order to describe the ‘Foucauldian’ approach to discourse analysis Foucault’s 
conceptualisation of ‘discourse’ will be first be elucidated. Foucault’s definition 
and ways of thinking about discourse render its meaning quite different to 
Anglo-American traditions, which typically see discourse as an illustration of the 
use of language. Instead Foucault views discourse as describing “rules, 
divisions, and systems of a particular body of knowledge” (Arribas-Ayllon & 
Walkerdine, 2008). It is a “system of statements which constructs an object” 
(Parker, 1992, p.5). Discourse is therefore, according to Foucault, closer to the 
concept of ‘discipline’ both in relation to disciplinary divisions of knowledge such 
as economics, medicine or psychiatry; and in relation to disciplinary practices 
within institutions of social control such as the prison, the school or the hospital 
(Arribas-Ayllon & Walkerdine, 2008). Foucault’s idea of discourse “shows the 
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historically specific relations between disciplines (defined as bodies of 
knowledge) and disciplinary practices (forms of social control and social 
possibility)” (McHoul and Grace,1993). For example, mandating that for a 
patient to be considered ‘ready’ for therapy they must demonstrate 
‘psychological mindedness’, or ‘insight’ on some level, accepting they have a 
mental illness and therefore adhering to a biomedical model of distress. 
Discourse is therefore implicated in relation to power and knowledge: in 
privileging certain types of knowledge, dominant discourses make available 
ways of being that have implications for how power is exercised.  
 
Power, as theorised by Foucault, moves beyond the unitary conceptualisations 
of Marxism and structuralism (Arribas-Ayllon & Walkerdine, 2008). Foucault 
held that power was not simply a repressive force but productive (Oksala, 2007) 
and as functioning in direct relation to knowledge. Through cultural norms and 
scientific discourses subjects are constituted, rather than repressed, by power. 
Fields of knowledge and relations of power are intrinsically joined together in 
what Foucault referred to as power-knowledge relations (Oksala, 2007). 
Foucault maintained that the regulation of scientific practice is always bound to 
the power relations of the society in question. It is the power-knowledge nexus 
which is argued to be constitutive of subjects.  The subject for Foucault is 
identified as product rather than producer, constituted via the productive 
functioning of power (Kendall & Wickham, 1999).  The subject position thus 
functions within a triad of power, knowledge and the subject, and has 
implications for the action of an individual. Foucault described his work as a 
genealogy of the modern subject: “a history of how people are constructed as 
different types of subject – as delinquents, homosexuals, mentally ill, or, 
through such exclusions, as normal and healthy” (Oksala, 2007). This 
understanding of the subject, and the possibility of resistance, is tied to the 
social constructionist position of a critical stance to taken-for-granted knowledge 
(Gergen, 1985). When subjectivities or identities are revealed as social 
constructions rather than expressed as natural truths, the potential to contest or 
transform degrading or oppressive identities is unlocked. In FDA therefore, by 
understanding the positioning of subjects in relation to power and knowledge, 
there lies the possibility for action, for acting in an alternative way, for 
resistance. If power is understood relationally in this way, as constantly shifting 
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in relation to knowledge, discourse and the subject, resistance cannot be 
conceptualised as opposed to power, rather it is intrinsic to it. As Foucault 
emphasises “Where there is power, there is resistance, and yet, or rather 
consequently, this resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to 
power (Foucault, 1978a, p.95).  
 
FDA can be conceptualised more as a collection of methodological tools rather 
than a specifically defined methodology and there are varying approaches to 
the process (cf. Parker, 1992; Willig; 2003; Arribas-Ayllon & Walkerdine, 2008). 
However, Arribas-Ayllon & Walkerdine (2008) have suggested that there are 
three dimensions common to the production of Foucauldian-informed research: 
consideration of power and its functioning, an historical or ‘genealogical’ 
approach to current discourse and finally an analysis of the processes of 
subjectification (Arribas-Ayllon & Walkerdine, 2008). Foucault’s elucidation of 
knowledge as tied to both power and discourse, can be seen to implicate 
psychology as holding a role in the constitution of the social domain (Arribas-
Ayllon & Walkerdine, 2008). The subject in psychology is thus shifted, from one 
with internal ‘truths’ to be uncovered via scientific measurements and 
assessment, to one who is in fact constituted by those processes and 
technologies of power (Foucault, 1968) intrinsic to the discipline. Subjectivities, 
it must be clarified, are not directly determined by discourses and Foucault 
specifies the element of chance inherent in the formation of subjects (Foucault, 
1982).  
 
2.5.2 Analytical Tools  
“I would like my books to be a kind of tool-box which others can rummage 
through to find a tool which they can use however they wish in their own area” 
(Foucault, 1994, cited in O’Farrell, 2005, p.50).  With these words of Foucault in 
mind this research will draw on some of Foucault’s conceptual ‘tools’, which will 
be elaborated on below.  
 
2.5.2.1 Disciplinary power Foucault’s conception of disciplinary power, 
developed through his genealogical study in Discipline and Punish (1975), was 
based around Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon. In this ideal prison design a 
central tower fitted with large windows looks out onto a surrounding circle of 
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cells in which the inmate, separated in his cell and unable to see fellow inmates, 
is continuously visible, unable to see where and when and if the guard is 
looking.  By inducing this state of permanent visibility the effect of the 
Panopticon is to generate the internalization of a permanent self-surveillance, 
and thus self-disciplining, within the individual, ensuring the automatic 
functioning of power. The functioning of panoticism in psychiatric units also 
demonstrates the intrinsic relationship between knowledge and power. The 
continuous observation of patients facilitates assessment, the use of this 
knowledge then enabling the effects of power. 
 
2.5.2.2 Governmentality: Foucault’s conceptualisation of governmentality 
(Foucault, 1978b) operates in line with his later thoughts on power: a force 
which operates through power-relations, multidirectionally (as opposed to the 
downward oppressive force outlined in Marxism) and with a plurality of effects 
(Downing, 2008, p19). Foucault (1978b) articulates governmentality as a 
specific form of political functioning, a technology of power with the population 
at its center as an object of scientific knowledge and statistical measurement. It 
accounts for practices of self-formation, or ‘technologies of the self’ (Foucault, 
1988) in which individuals effect, by their own means, operations on their own 
bodies, minds and souls, transformations by which to attain a certain state of 
happiness of quality of life.  
 
 In Foucault’s use of the term he sought to apply the broad meaning of the word 
‘government’. Thus governmentality is not necessarily identified with the organs 
of state power, although these can be linked or implicated, but with the guiding 
of the behaviour of another, the conducting of their conduct (Thompson, 2003). 
In line with neoliberal forms of government, governmentality as a technology of 
the self, is closely tied to normalisation (section 2.5.2.3) and responsibilization 
whereby the subject is led to see social risks such as poverty, unemployment or 
illness, not as the responsibility of the state but as the responsibility of the 
individual, constructing these problems as ‘self-care’ (Lemke, 2001, p 201) or 
‘consumption’ (Giesler & Veresiu, 2014).  
 
2.5.2.3 Normalization: Scientific or medical knowledge, it was acknowledged by 
Foucault (1978a), are privileged forms of knowledge within our society. 
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Particular scientific discourses have normalizing effects as behaviours, 
experiences and desires are collated, measured and shaped to create a norm. 
According to Rose (1999) a norm is that “which is socially worthy, statistically 
average, scientifically healthy and personally desirable” (p. 76). Subjectification 
then occurs through the internalization of and adherence to these norms. By 
pursuing normality through adjusting and transforming our behaviour, we 
become individual subjects. Individuality is thus minimized by norms, which 
reduce subjects to a bell curve or ‘normal distribution’. Through observation and 
assessment the clinician thus defines both normality and abnormality through 
coding and classification.  
 
2.5.2.4 Ethical Fourfold: In the second and third volumes of The History of 
Sexuality (1984a & 1984b ) Foucault lays out his particular conceptualisation of 
ethics, traced back to antiquity. Ethics can be seen to refer to the way in which 
a subject of morality forms themself, acting in reference to the prescriptive 
elements of morality. In these later writings Foucault appeared to shift his focus 
from power and practices of domination towards practices of the self: modes of 
action that individuals exercised upon themselves (Oksala, 2007) or, in relation 
to ethics, the self’s relationship to itself. The Ethical Fourfold describes the 
modalities through which the formation of the ethical subject could be 
examined. It entails:  
1. One’s ethical substance, ‘ontology’, the part of the self that is the 
principal focus of ethical behaviour. 
2.  The mode of subjectification ‘deontology’, the way in which the subject 
recognises their ethical obligations by establishing their relation to the 
moral code. 
3.  The ethical work engaged in, ‘ascetics’, via technologies of the self, in 
order to become an ethical subject 
4. The ‘telos’ or goal of ethical activity aspired to in the ethical work of the 
subject. The below analysis will focus particularly on component two: the 
mode of subjectification. 
 
(Foucault, 1984a & 1984b).  
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Foucault’s concern was with the self as a problem, one that requires 
manipulation and production, thereby becoming a basis for ethics.  
 
2.6 Procedure 
 
2.6.1  Ethics 
The University of East London Ethics Committee gave ethical approval for this 
study9. NHS ethical approval was not necessary due to the participants’ roles as 
clinicians in the NHS and therefore, as specified in current guidance, were not 
deemed to be vulnerable. Consent was obtained from each participant pre and 
post interview. Confidentiality and anonymity guidelines were followed with all 
identifiable information changed.  
 
2.6.2 Participants 
 
2.6.2.1 Sample size: Ten participants were interviewed in total. This was 
considered  to enable a range of discourses to emerge from data collection 
 
2.6.2.2 Participant selection criteria and recruitment: The type of participants 
recruited was determined by the research question. It was felt that two of the 
professional groups: clinical psychologists and psychiatrists, working in adult 
inpatient services, would facilitate a representation of professionals involved in 
processes of referral for and assessment of RFT. Purposive sampling 
(Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2010) was used to recruit appropriate participants. Initial 
contact was made with an Acute Forum of clinical psychologists working in 
inpatient services within a London NHS Trust. They were sent an information 
letter10 and subsequently interviews were arranged. Following each interview 
participants were approached for professional contacts, both psychiatrists and 
clinical psychologists who would meet selection criteria for interview. 
 
2.6.2.3 Profile of participants: Of the ten participants five were female and five 
were male. As stipulated by the inclusion criteria, they all worked in acute adult 
inpatient wards in both assessment wards and treatment wards. Five 
participants were clinical psychologists and five were psychiatrists. Both 
                                                          
9 See Appendix C 
10 See Appendix D 
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professional groups included participants across a number of pay bands 
including psychiatrists on training rotations through to service leads.   
 
2.6.2.4 Profile of wards: Participants worked in a range of acute adult inpatient 
wards. including ‘assessment’ or ‘triage’ and ‘treatment’ wards. 
Assessment/triage wards are brief stay wards to which all patients requiring 
admission will go for brief assessment and treatment before being either 
discharged or transferred to a treatment ward (AIMS, 2010). The average length 
of stay on a triage ward is seven days, compared to 22 days on a standard or 
‘treatment’ acute ward. About half of all admissions to a triage ward are 
transferred to another inpatient ward (Williams et al, 2014). ‘Long-stayers’ are 
defined as being admissions of more than 90 days (Smith and Chakraborty, 
2012). As highlighted in chapter one, the population of acute wards has shifted, 
with a higher proportion of those admitted falling under the diagnostic criteria of 
schizophrenia/schizoaffective disorder (59%), followed by mood disorders 
(21%), personality disorders (12%) and organic causes/dementia (9%) (Smith 
and Chakraborty, 2012). 
 
2.6.2.5 Profile of the researcher: Reflexivity and subject positioning: In line with 
the critical realist approach of this study the importance of reflexivity will be a 
key element throughout the analytic process. Haraway (1988) critiques the 
‘God’s eye view’ in positivist research, arguing that it is impossible for the 
researcher to be positioned “outside of” the subject matter (p. 6) as their own 
standpoint will unavoidably shape the process of the research and its findings. 
Both personal and epistemological reflexivity are viewed as important (Willig, 
2001). Personal reflexivity involves an acknowledgement of the two-way 
process in which our values, experiences, beliefs and social identities inform 
research and, equally, how the process of carrying out the research influences 
these elements and has the capacity to change us as researchers and as 
people. Epistemological reflexivity encourages reflection on assumptions made 
about the world and about knowledge, promoting consideration of the 
implications for the research based on these assumptions (Willig, 2001). As 
such, a reflective journal will be kept throughout the research process to enable 
reflexivity from both a personal and epistemological position and, additionally, to 
allow for transparency and critical self-reflection (Ortlipp, 2008).  
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I identify as a female, white-British, trainee clinical psychologist. My training at 
the University of East London has influenced my critical thinking to a great 
extent and has enabled me to reflect on my experiences of working in inpatient 
settings over the past ten years, both before and during training. I am also a 
psychodynamically-trained music therapist. This is important in relation to 
reflecting on the process of this research for two reasons. Firstly, the 
participants who were clinical psychologists may have positioned me, 
consciously or unconsciously, as an ‘insider’, aligned to them as a colleague 
(albeit a less experienced one, still in the process of training) in the same 
discipline; whereas the psychiatrists interviewed may not have made those 
same assumptions. This could have potentially the result of the clinical 
psychologists entering into an ‘us and them’ discourse when reflecting on 
psychiatric interventions and conventions and additionally could have created 
the potential for a defensive subject positioning in the psychiatrists. Moreover, 
as a music therapist I may also have positioned myself in the subject position of 
‘outsider’ in relation to both professions, with music therapy viewed as less 
evidence-based and a less mainstream provision than clinical psychology. 
Secondly my training and former role as a music therapist has undoubtedly 
affected my opinions on therapeutic interventions which mandate a verbal 
engagement; linked to this my view of discourse as central to human 
experience may be different than a therapist trained in other, purely verbal 
approaches11  
 
2.7  Data Collection 
 
2.7.1 Interviews 
Semi-structured interviews were employed due to the capacity for increased 
flexibility for both the researcher and participant, enabling the opportunity for 
either to pursue areas of interest arising from the talk (Smith, 1995), supporting 
the researcher to attain a particular level of depth not accessible by other 
approaches (Byrne, 2004). Semi-structured interviews were also felt to be 
congruent with the social constructionist approach of the study. As outlined by 
                                                          
11 See Appendix E. 
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Silverman (1993), the interviewee is given an opportunity to construct their 
version of the world in the context of the posed question (Silverman, 1993). 
 
Additionally, participants were asked to complete an element of memory work 
before meeting the researcher for the interview and were provided with 
guidance on how to carry it out12. Inspired by the feminist, social constructionist 
research method ‘Memory Work’ (Haug,1987; Crawford, Kippaz & Onyx,1992), 
memories were used as an additional prompt to help produce richer and more 
personalised narratives.  
Each participant was asked to write two memories in preparation for the 
interview: one about a particular time when they had made a decision about 
when someone was ready for therapy and another about time when they had 
made the decision that someone was not ready for therapy.  
The steps outlined for the participants are as follows: 
1. Write 1 to 2 pages about a particular episode, action, or event  
2. Write in the third person using a pseudonym. 
3. Write in as much detail as possible, including even what might be considered 
to be trivial or inconsequential. 
4. Describe the experience; do not import interpretation, explanation, or 
biography.  
(Crawford, Kippaz & Onyx, 1992) 
 
Use and adaptation of this element of Memory Work enabled a space for 
participants to focus in detail on examples of clinical decision-making around 
RFT. In evaluation of this process, this enabled the participants to have more 
time to reflect on their examples, not being ‘put on the spot’ during interview. 
Additionally in provided a space for the participants to answer in a more neutral 
manner a broad question, which could, therefore, be answered in a number of 
different directions, as opposed to being guided by more detailed interview 
                                                          
12 See Appendix D 
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questions. Due to time constrains Memory Work was not carried out as a full 
methodology however, this may be a direction for any future research in this 
area to elicit further understandings of practice through the other phases of the 
methodology, for example, through focus groups.  
 
The interview agenda13 was constructed and agreed in collaboration with my 
research supervisor and was guided by a broad list of themes relevant to the 
literature review and research questions.  Prior to the interview participants 
were sent information packs containing a consent form. At the beginning of 
each interview consent and confidentiality was discussed with participants who 
then signed the consent form14 confirming that they had agreed to take part in 
the research, that the interview would be audio-recorded and for the material to 
be used in this research and for future publications. The interviews were 
conducted at the participants’ places of work and were audio-recorded. 
 
2.7.2   Transcription 
Ten participants produced a total of 555 minutes of data (range 42-76 minutes). 
Interviews were recorded and were transcribed verbatim using a simplified 
Jefferson-lite approach (Parker, 2005) in order to capture both what is said and 
the way it is said.15 Participant information was coded into number (1,2,3) sex 
(M/F) and profession (CP- Clinical Psychologist or P - Psychiatrist), for 
example: P1MCP, in order to ensure confidentiality and anonymity. 
 
2.7.3 Extracts 
Extracts from participants’ interviews will be employed to exemplify the 
discursive sites. Using extracts as a foundation for analysis has been 
recommended as an essential benchmark in qualitative research, enabling  
contextualisation of the data, “sensitivity to context” (Yardley, 2008), rigour and 
transparency.  
 
2.8  Analysis 
 
                                                          
13 See Appendix F 
14 See Appendix G 
15 See Appendix H   
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As there is no one specified way of carrying out an FDA, the analysis of the 
data was carried out using a synthesis of steps adapted from Arribas-Ayllon and 
Walkerdine’s (2008) discussion of how to complete an FDA, and Willig’s six-
stage process (2001) and employing Adams’ (2016) set of flexible guidelines for 
the analysis of data, subjectivity and practices, elucidated below. 
 
The interview recordings were listened to multiple times during the process of 
transcription, facilitating immersion in the data. The transcribed interviews were 
then re-read whilst listening to the interview recordings, enabling the researcher 
to check for accuracy and to engage in a reflexive process with the data. This 
was enabled through use of a reflexive journal to note any points of interest at 
this stage.  
 
Analysis of the data was carried out by engaging with questions asked of the 
data in relation to theoretical concepts outlined by Foucault, analytic foci, which 
formed a number of stages as described by Arribas-Ayllon and Walkerdine 
(2008), Willig (2001) and Adams (2016): 
 
1. What is the object being constructed in the talk? 
2. How is the object being constructed in the talk? 
3. What is the function of this construction? 
4. What subject positions are being made available? 
5. What are the processes of subjectification? 
6. What are the technologies deployed in the talk, and what are the 
implications for social practice?16 
(Adams, 2016). 
A process of mapping the various constructions of discursive objects was then 
carried out, for example: readiness as rational, resourced, stabilized; therapy as 
long/continuous/a difficult process; clinician as ethical/adaptor/expert. This 
facilitated an examination of the ways in which the participants constructed their 
understandings of RFT. The next five stages were then used on the data in line 
with the discursive constructions of the objects identified. The process of writing 
                                                          
16 See Appendix I for a detailed explanation of these steps and analytic foci. 
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the analysis was the final stage, wherein certain extracts were chosen which 
were seen to answer the research questions.  The analysis chapter therefore 
emphasises attention to the ways in which the participants constructed their 
understanding of: the ‘ready’ therapeutic subject, their practice, and themselves 
as clinicians in relation to the macrostructures they are working within.  This 
approach was intended to facilitate an examination of implications for 
subjectivities, practice and access in relation to RFT. 
 
An example of the main analytic steps will be provided herein, drawing on 
material relating to appendix K. The full analysis relating to this extract and how 
it is integrated into the overall analysis is to be found in section 3.2.2, extract 15. 
 
1. What is the object being constructed in the talk?: Unreadiness, in the 
extract in appendix K, is the object being constructed in the talk.  
2. How is the object being constructed and problematised?: 
Unreadiness is constructed in this extracts as “passive aggressive”, 
“putting questions back onto” the participant, as “hostile” as “a manic 
edge”, as “less amenable” and as a “defensive reaction”. Unreadiness is 
problematized, as it is constructed via the power-knowledge nexus, as a 
barrier to therapy. The discursive object, here unreadiness, can be seen 
as a product of the intersection of alternate discourses in which the 
patient’s action of “putting questions back onto” the psychologist could 
have been perceived, in an alternative discursive construction, as an act 
of resistance rather than as “passive aggression”. The power-knowledge 
relations of the therapeutic interaction are thus revealed in this extract: 
the psychologist holds expert knowledge which intersects with the power 
to make the decision of readiness for, and therefore access to, therapy. 
3. Functionality of the construction: The functionality of these different 
constructions of the discursive object, enables the psychologist to 
manage her resources. The construction of unreadiness is problematized 
here as it is used as a label for those who may attempt to hold agency in 
the assessment space, who may wish to resist being positioned as client 
or analysand.  
4. Identification of discursive subjects: the discursive subject being 
constructed in this extract is that of the unready patient. The clinician is 
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constructing a ‘ready’ subject who will conform to the norms of therapy, 
and “engage”, as opposed to one who is resisting the subject position of 
‘patient’, ‘client’ or ‘analysand’. 
5. Processes of subjectification: these processes result in a subject 
whose subjectivity is constructed through the lens of observation, which 
results in judgements being made concerning ‘readiness’. The unready 
subject is one who is labelled within a biomedical discourse as a subject 
who has a “manic edge” and whose attempts at occupying a different 
subject position  -  are labelled as “resistance”. This results in a subject 
who, should they wish to access therapy, must occupy the position of the 
“ready” patient, one who is “less unwell” and more “amenable”. 
6. Technologies of power and implications for social practice: the 
technologies of power at play here are disciplinary power: centered 
around surveillance, through observations of “presentation” on the ward 
and assessment of “engagement” and normalisation through the 
requirement for adherence to constructions of the “ready subject” in order 
to access therapy. We can also observe the interdependence of power 
and resistance, whereby the attempt to resist the pathologised subject 
position of unreadiness due to “defence mechanisms” is constructed as 
“hostile”, “passive aggressive” and ultimately “unready”. Here the 
process of analytic control on the part of the psychologist can be seen as 
a technology of power which facilitates the psychologist to position 
herself as an ethical practitioner and to manage her resources. 
The final stage of analysis for this example can be seen in section 3.2.2, extract 
15, whereby the analytic stages are integrated into the overall analysis.  
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CHAPTER THREE: ANALYSIS 
 
 
This chapter will review the analytic approach and structure before elaborating 
upon the central findings of the analysis in relation to the research questions. 
From a critical realist social constructionist stance, a Foucauldian Discourse 
Analysis (FDA) was used due to its focus on the constructive power of language 
and emphasis on the mediation of power relations through discourse (Burr, 
2003) thus enabling an exploration of the differing forms of social power 
stemming from these constructions (Harper and Spellman, 2006). As 
highlighted by Haraway (1988), Willig (2013) and others, it is not possible for a 
researcher to position themselves outside of the subject matter, it is timely 
therefore, to note that my analysis, whilst methodologically rigourous, is just one 
way of constructing many possible readings of the data, the whole process of 
analysis being situated in relation to my own historical and cultural context (Van 
Dijk, 2011). It is, in itself, a discursive construction, which, through my own 
positioning, constructs knowledge (Willig, 2013).  
 
The structure of this analysis centers on clinicians’ constructions of the ideal 
‘ready’ subject, their constructions of unreadiness as a tool for supporting the 
expert position, and their constructions of their identity as an ethical subject. 
Analysis was carried out using the methodology described in the previous 
section. Each extract17 was considered in relation to:  
- What objects were constructed in the talk and the functionality of these 
constructions. 
- Subject positions constructed by various discourses and the implication 
for subjectivity. 
- Technologies of power utilized and the associated effects. 
 
 3.1 Clinicians’ Constructions of the Ideal ‘Ready’ Therapeutic Subject 
 
This section will demonstrate the multitude of ways the participants constructed 
the subject who is ‘ready’ for therapy. Discourses of rationality, displayed by the 
subject via psychological-mindedness or insight, function alongside discourses 
                                                          
17 See Appendix J for an example of an annotated extract. 
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of personal resources such as intelligence, verbal fluency and emotional 
strength to construct a ’ready’ subject who fulfills neoliberal values. These 
extracts highlight the effects of normalization as a process of subjectification 
and the technologies of power used to construct an idealised therapeutic 
subject who, whilst ready for therapy, does not and cannot exist on the ward.  
 
3.1.1 Readiness and the Ideal Therapeutic Subject 
“Psy-function” (Foucault, 1973): a shifting area of knowledge and power over 
the mind, including psychoanalysis, psychology, psychiatry, psychotherapy, 
psycho-pharmacology, social psychology and criminology. Their function in 
sites of discipline: schools, military, prisons, hospitals, and industry (Foucault, 
2006) acts via disciplinary power, which aims at restoring the efficiency of the 
individual and collective performance. Madness is seen, in this context, as a 
lack of efficiency or a waste of energy on the part of the patient (Leoni, 2013). 
These technologies function on a broad spectrum, from disciplining practices on 
inpatient wards, to the neo-liberal, self-disciplining technologies of psy-
enterprise: self-help books, agony-aunt columns in magazines and newspapers, 
life-coaching and the current popularity of mindfulness (Binkley, 2011). The aim 
of these technologies is to construct a neoliberal subject who is capable of self-
regulation in order to function successfully, work productively and remain free 
from interference or intervention from the state - the epitome of success 
according to neoliberal governments. Participants constructed the ‘ready’ 
therapeutic subject as a ‘rational’ unitary subject (Henriques et al, 1998a ) 
resourced with multiple abilities or traits.  
 
3.1.1.1 Readiness as rationality: Rationality was constructed by the clinicians 
through the use of various discourses including primarily ‘insight’ and 
‘psychological-mindedness’. 
 
Extract: 1 
 
P10FP:…In the ward round, for the first week she would not engage at 
all. She would come and say “I don’t have a diagnosis of bipolar disorder, 
I haven’t taken an overdose, I had no intention to die and I need to be out 
of the hospital”. And she was quite firm and quite came across like 
54 
 
somebody who knew what she was saying and looked like she had 
insight. But the way she was minimizing the risk of the episode that had 
happened and refusing to recollect the events of what happened kind of 
left everybody with a sense of anxiety and (.) puzzling. What, what, what 
is this about? […] She was not communicating, she didn't have insight 
and maybe, we thought, she is so disturbed with everything that is going 
on that she would not be able to engage with psychology the way it 
should. (516-518). 
 
In this extract we can observe the construction of a subject who is considered 
‘ready’ for therapy as one who demonstrates their ‘insight’ by accepting their 
diagnosis, and therefore taking a ‘rational’ approach to their own distress. As 
argued by Foucault in Madness and Civilization, the traditional accounts of the 
‘recognition’ of madness as illness, frame this event as a humane ‘liberation’ of 
the mad. Foucault asserts this as a myth, beneath which lies a series of 
technologies organizing the world of psychiatry, the asylum and methods of 
cure, according to fear, confinement and moral condemnation, the same 
principles that had been prevalent in the classical age (Oksala, 2007). The 
construction of insight here echoes those found in the literature: willingness to 
label experiences as pathological, acceptance of mental illness and agreement 
with treatment (David, 1990). 
 
In the next extract ‘insight’ can be seen functioning as a technology of power 
(Foucault, 1975). 
 
Extract: 2 
 
  P6FP:…We were doing a lot of insight referring. When someone…  
RR   How do you mean, insight referring? 
P6 So, like if someone really didn’t have any insight into their illness but 
was doing really well and we thought that maybe if we made a start 
while they were on a treatment ward  
RR Mmmhmm? 
P6 And that could facilitate further their input in terms of insight into their 
illness in the community that would be beneficial. But it turns out that 
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most of our patients didn’t have any insight and so the referrals that we 
were making were too many and so they, the psy, the trainee 
psychologist set up a group focusing on insight on the wards.   
(134-144).  
 
Participant six aligns the aims of psychological therapeutic intervention with 
psychiatry and the medical model, viewing madness as ‘illness’, into which the 
patient must have ‘insight’. Psychology as the ‘facilitator’ of insight in which 
therapy is employed as a technology of power, and psychiatry as the ‘insight 
referrer’ are engaged in a process of subjectification in which expert knowledge 
is deployed within the power-knowledge nexus whereby the patient could be 
“facilitated further…in terms of insight into their illness in the community”. The 
implications around liberty as linked to “the community” and ‘insight’ as 
acceptance of mental illness are palpable. In order to function in ‘the 
community’, in society outside of the ward the subject must be form themselves 
as a neoliberal subject with ‘insight’. In this context, human capital is waiting to 
be restored, here by the provision of “groups, focusing on insight on the wards” 
with insight presented as something that can be moulded and cultivated or 
encouraged, an object of intervention by professionals. The description by 
participant six: “it turns out that most of our patients didn’t have any insight” also 
demonstrates the incompatibility with this concept on the ward, where people 
are in crisis. It could be argued that if the patient had adhered more to 
professionals’ view of their experience, they would have been less likely to end 
up on the ward in the first place. Processes of normalisation thus function here 
through the internalization of and adherence to the norms required of the 
rational ‘ready’ therapeutic subject who is able to cultivate ‘insight’ in order to be 
discharged and function in the ‘community’. 
 
Extract: 3 
 
P1MCP:…I think there’s a lot of expectation ((2)) certainly has been, 
and that’s what this psychological mindedness thing for example, that 
we (.) we do our thing, and if you can adapt to that then you’re in (.) 
and if you can’t adapt to that then you’re out. (.) And I just don’t think 
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that’s reasonable I think it should be us that adapt. Now of course 
there’s some people, there still has to be a line. 
RR Mmmhmm? 
P1 Because there’s some people where actually (.) you know, I mean if 
you’re going to sit with somebody hour on hour and they cannot 
speak to you well then that’s probably not going to get you anywhere. 
Or if, you know, somebody really really is not (.) able to have a 
conversation with you which is about anything other than how 
everything is other people’s fault. (623-639). 
 
This extract demonstrates a counter-discourse where the psychologist counters 
expectations of ‘psychological-mindedness’ and ability to adapt to “our thing” 
with his own view that “I think it should be us that adapt”. The majority of the 
participants’ descriptions of therapy (to be addressed in section 3.3.2) construct 
it as static and model-based, unable to be adjusted or repositioned as it would 
then no longer adhere to discourses of ‘evidence-based-practice’ or follow NICE 
Guidelines. Therapy and the clinician are therefore constructed as holding 
themselves still, unable to respond to a subject who does not fit in to the 
therapeutic structure. This counter-discourse, constructed by participant one, 
highlights possibilities for changing practice whereby instead of expecting the 
patient to shift and adapt to the norms of therapy, the therapist occupies the 
subject position ‘adaptor’ and therapy is constructed as an object which can 
move and change in response to distress. However, even this counter-
discourse has a limit: “there still has to be a line”. This ‘line’ is discursively dually 
constructed as the capacity to speak to the psychologist and the ability to take 
responsibility and “have a conversation which is about anything other than how 
everything is other people’s fault”. The intimation by the psychologist of the 
necessity to take personal responsibility is again a requirement for a subject 
who accepts they are ‘ill’, whose distress is not “other people’s fault”. A 
discourse of ‘responsibilization’ could be seen to be functioning here, whereby 
the construction of distress is internalised and inextricably linked to neo-liberal 
discourses of individualization and ‘responsibilization’ (Rose, 1999) leading the 
subject to construct their experiences of, for example, poverty, unemployment 
or illness as their responsibility, constructing the solution to these problems as 
‘self-care’ as opposed to the responsibility of the state (Lemke, 2001). The 
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‘vulnerability-stress’ model is also implied here in which biological vulnerability 
is impacted on by stress. As Boyle (2002) points out, this model maintains the 
primacy of biology, by making it look as if the ‘stress’ of the model consists of 
ordinary stresses which most of us would cope with, but which overwhelm only 
‘vulnerable’ people. (Boyle, 2002); thus implying individual vulnerability and 
creating a thinly veiled biomedical explanation (Pilgrim, 2002).  If the subject 
can take responsibility for their role in their distress, responsibility for their 
vulnerability, as opposed to other people’s “fault”, they can then “get 
somewhere” through talking to the psychologist and making changes through 
this technology of the self (Foucault, 1984a & 1984b).  
 
Not only was readiness constructed by the participants as requiring a rational 
subject but madness or “thought disorder” was closely linked to unreadiness 
and seen as “polluting” the therapeutic interaction. 
 
Extract: 4 
 
P9MCP:…I don’t know how confident I would feel that I’m doing 
something useful for someone with a thought disorder. Erm, and if 
someone is unable to kind of communicate with me in those sessions 
then I feel like there’s not much scope for helping them.  
RR Mmm. 
P9 So it’s if, when something pollutes the interaction enough might be a 
problem. Naturally  
RR  By polluting do you mean: the thought disorder or…? 
P9  Yeah, a thought disorder, or thinking quite concretely. And someone who 
struggles to reflect or see that they have an opinion on something and 
there are different perspectives of that same thing. (735-746). 
 
The construction of thought disorder as something that “pollutes the interaction” 
by the clinical psychologist here is a powerful metaphor, a pollutant being 
associated with disgust, to be avoided and expelled. This construction of 
thought disorder resonates strongly with Foucault’s descriptions of the shift in 
understanding of and treatment of madness in the mid-17th century falling 
outside the spectrum of what was considered human and linked to the need for 
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confinement. If participant nine considers thought disorder as “polluting the 
interaction” and consequently does not know “how confident” they’d feel “doing 
something useful for someone with a thought disorder” this positions the subject 
as someone who is to be confined, not treated (or at least not treated with 
therapy), and as a threat to rationality. Pollution is a construct strongly linked to 
feelings of disgust which are, in themselves, socially constructed and differ 
widely from culture to culture, with representational discourses, in this case 
around “thought-disorder” as “polluting” clearly playing a part in transmitting 
disciplinary practices. Again it is the clinician, within the power-knowledge 
nexus, who defines what is rational and what might be “thought-disordered” and 
“polluting” to the interaction. And again the paradox present in this construction 
can be seen: the ‘ready’ therapeutic subject constructed by the clinician cannot, 
therefore, be one who is “mad”, who is an inpatient on the ward.  
 
By drawing on a discourse of ‘rationality’ the participants are enacting power-
knowledge relations in order to construct the subject they need to be ‘ready’ to 
access therapy. It is the professional who defines what is rational and what isn’t. 
The language of psychiatry (and psychology) thus functioning as Foucault 
outlined in Madness and Civilization “as a monologue of reason about 
madness” (Foucault, 1965). In these extracts the ‘ready’ subject is constructed 
as rational; a subject who is ‘psychologically-minded’ and with ‘insight; a 
responsibilized, verbal subject who can sit with the psychologist for an hour and 
have a conversation about “anything other than how everything is other 
people’s fault”. The paradox of these prerequisites of ‘readiness’ for therapy 
constructed by the participants is created by the environment in which they are 
situated: the inpatient ward, where traditionally the subject occupying this space 
would have been expected to be irrational, expected to be mad, the very reason 
they occupy that space being madness.  
 
3.1.1.2 Readiness as resourced: Another way in which the participants 
constructed the subject who is ready for therapy centred on a subject who is 
resourced: with intelligence; verbal fluency; capacity to understand the 
significance of meeting with the psychologist; ability to pick up on the social and 
clinical conventions of the session; abilities to talk psychologically, to build a 
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rapport, to reflect, to take challenge or probing and emotional strength enough 
to complete the conversation.  
 
Extract: 5 
 
P1MCP:…I think based on the fact that he’s, you know, he’s a bright guy 
who kind of, verbally can be very fluent and very agile erm, and so in a 
way you’d kind of think: here’s a chap who should be seeing a 
psychologist. (146-148). 
 
Extract: 6 
 
P4MCP:…I do think there is, um, a kind of ((2)) some real basic things like 
the capacity to understand (.) what is being said […] to use language, to 
be able to reason, to understand the significance of meeting (.) with the 
psychologist, what it might mean. You know someone might never have 
seen a psychologist to actually sort of pick up on, the (()) you know, what 
the social conventions, the sort of clinical conventions quickly. I mean 
socialised to it. Yeah. So I mean that, all in itself, that, that, that touches on 
certain prerequisites. (566-578). 
 
A subject who is able to pick up on the “clinical conventions” quickly indicates 
processes of normalisation whereby the subject not only internalises the truths 
and norms of psychiatry and psychology, but is also able to demonstrate this 
“cultural capital” (Bourdieu, 1986) in order to access therapy. RFT is thus 
assessed by the clinician, based on their prospective patient being able to form 
themselves as a neoliberal subject, able to self-govern through consumption of 
the ‘new technologies of citizenship’ (Rose, 1992) such as psychology, 
psychotherapy. 
 
In an earlier statement from extract three “if you’re going to sit with somebody 
for an hour and they cannot speak to you well then that’s probably not going to 
get you anywhere” (P1MCP) the construction of the ‘ready’ subject also 
includes the capability and motivation to use language. Psychology as a ‘talking 
therapy’, a term with its roots in Freud’s ‘talking cure’, is inherently dependent 
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on language, which is seen by classical metaphysics as an attribute specific to 
mankind and what it means to be human. The ability to convey verbal accounts 
of distress to the clinician thus constructs a subject who again fulfills a 
construction of a unitary subject with a core inner self which can be accessed or 
not depending on their ability to speak to the psychologist.  
 
In using the phrase “socialised to it” in relation to the patient being able to “pick 
up on the social conventions, the clinical conventions” the psychologist seems 
to be referencing a routine practice within Cognitive Behavioural Therapy 
(CBT). In this context CBT presupposes the existence of a “verbally fluent and 
agile” individual with an internal world that can be accurately communicated to 
another through speech (Newnes, 2011 p.217). Situated in alliance with the 
biomedical model CBT can be seen as a regulatory practice operating at a 
micro level, constructing a ‘ready’ subject who is “socialized” to engage in 
therapy by locating their problems on an individual, internal level and concurring 
with assumptions of individual pathology that need addressing (Boyle, 2011).  
 
Extract: 7 
 
 P5FP:…And then I guess, look for those first signs that somebody 
may be, may have the right ability to pay attention and concentrate, 
may be able to talk, may be able to think emotionally, talk 
psychologically, may be emotionally strong enough to, to erm, to 
com-complete the conversation and erm, and be interested in 
engaging in it. 
RR Mmm 
P5 Erm, so it, I think it’s a, an on-going thing and as you get to know 
someone better ((2)), particularly I guess seeing someone, everybody 
weekly, those people who engage in a conversation and are able to 
build a rapport and (.) reflect, who are able to erm (.) be robust and 
erm take feedback, or challenge or probing. (447-459). 
 
Throughout the data the participants construct an ideal therapeutic subject who 
is, in many ways, like them; expecting the patient to mould themselves into a 
similarity of the therapist and move towards conforming to the construction of a 
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white, middle-class, neoliberal subject in order to access therapy: verbally 
articulate, intelligent (or educated), someone emotionally strong and robust and 
able to regulate their own emotions. These constructions mirror findings in the 
literature confirming biases around race, social class and gender in diagnosis, 
rating level of adjustment, description of personality traits and psychiatric 
symptoms and referral to psychotherapy (Garb, 2006).  
 
These requirements of RFT are paradoxical in the construction of an ideal 
subject who, in the context of the ward, is never going to meet these criteria: if 
the subject possessed all these resources and capabilities it is highly unlikely 
that they would come to find themselves on a psychiatric ward. To interrogate 
this idea further, Smail (2011) elucidates how working in the NHS, a publicly-
funded institution, with people whose lack of resources results in reduced 
possibilities for arranging their lives, lays bare the illusion that ‘choice’ and ‘will 
power’ are innate potentialities. Rather, they are the result of material 
advantage (Smail, 2011). Additionally there is a trap of exclusion: if the patient 
is, due to being deemed ‘not ready’, denied access to those transforming 
technologies of the self, i.e. therapy, how can they be expected to transform 
themselves into the desired neoliberal, self-regulating subject? They are 
seemingly left to other technologies present on the ward: those of observation, 
self-surveillance and medication.  
 
3.1.2 ‘Stabilization’ and the Goldilocks Paradox 
Participants constructed readiness with contradictory expectations: stabilized 
but still on the ward, not too early, not too late; not in crisis but not too much 
after a crisis with the risk that they would have “sealed over”; a subject who is 
able to be vulnerable yet robust at the same time, thus creating a paradox of 
readiness in which the subject who is a patient on an inpatient ward cannot be 
considered ‘ready’ due to timing, location and requirements for mutually 
exclusive internal states. 
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Extract: 8 
 
P8FP:…Yeah, I think, for our patients it would be: have they, (.) has their 
mental state changed from acutely disturbed and agitated to slightly 
calmer and with some rationality in their thinking. (398-401). 
 
Extract: 9 
 
P9MCP:…So sometimes people are not ready for therapy because they 
don’t, they don’t want to face (.) erm that it’s too difficult for them to talk 
about now, or too scary to face, erm you know changing their behaviour 
so it’s too early in some ways. But then sometimes it’s kind of that it’s too 
late actually they’ve kind of sealed over, and they don’t, so you’ve kind of 
missed the window […] And they need a, and it’s recognised they need a 
period of stability to get the most from that, probably, and that kind of 
lends itself to readiness for therapy doesn’t it? So I, I kind of have the 
view actually that (.) when someone’s in crisis either it is the worst time 
because their life’s too chaotic, things are all up in the air, and they can’t, 
they don’t have the headspace erm, to make sense of what’s going on, to 
focus on what you’re saying. There’s too much threat at that moment for 
them to reflect and that does and I’ve got first-hand experience of 
watching someone have that experience. It’s very difficult to help them. 
The flip side of that is sometimes they’ve been in a crisis the absolute 
perfect moment because they haven’t sealed over, they’re willing to talk 
about it and they’re motivated to do something about it because things 
are at their worst. So sometimes I think it is actually the best moment. 
And it’s not a difficult decision to decide which one it is. It’s obvious.  
(699-703 & 892-916). 
 
In these extracts a ‘stabilization’ discourse can be seen, where psychology is 
constructed by participant five as something that needs “a period of stability” as 
“there’s too much threat at that moment for them to reflect”. Positioning 
problems to be addressed in therapy as in the past and to be reflected on after 
a “period of stability” can be seen in the context of the ‘safety behaviours’ 
outlined by Boyle (2011) in which clinical psychology and psychiatry partly 
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acknowledge the causal role of social situations and life experiences in distress 
but simultaneously minimize their impact by, for example, placing the 
experience in the past when they can “reflect” after a “period of stability”, thus 
enabling the impact of context to be obscured. Assumptions are also made in 
this construction that people will be discharged into a stable environment (the 
“threat” will have passed) conducive to the reflection needed to engage in 
therapy, and one in which the problems which led to admissions have resolved. 
In the context of how acute services are currently structured and the brevity of 
admissions, this is unlikely. Participant nine also outlines a position where he is 
making a decision concerning RFT based on whether the crisis that the person 
is experiencing makes it the “worst time” for therapy or the “best time”, 
emphasizing the role of “motivation” and echoing unclear findings in the 
literature around the role of distress in RFT (Schneider & Klauer, 2001; Derisley 
& Reynolds, 2000; Moore, Tambling & Anderson, 2013). The ‘ready’ therapeutic 
subject is therefore constructed as needing to be able to be peturbated in order 
to change, again within a paradoxical discourse of stabilization. This positioning 
reflects discourse in the literature which highlights the requirement for patients 
to live a ‘suspended life’ in institutional settings (such as forensic units) which 
instill a ‘regime of forgetting’ where past experiences are viewed as irrelevant to 
‘stabilization’ and experience is recoded into psychiatric discourse (Brown & 
Reavy, 2016).  
 
Participant eight constructed psychology as something which can be accessed 
when the patient’s “mental state” has changed from being “acutely disturbed 
and agitated to “slightly calmer”. It is not discussed by the participants how 
these changes might be effected, other than to indicate that it is not via therapy. 
Common practices in the context of acute inpatient psychiatry might lead us to 
surmise that involved in this stabilization discourse are implicated practices 
around medication. Additionally ward practices of ‘observation’ (to be addressed 
in section 3.2.1) function to generate a normalizing environment in which 
technologies of the self can flourish. 
 
In relation to disciplining practices, the stabilization discourse can be 
understood in this context as a means of control: the patient, through processes 
of subjectification, being expected to form themselves as an entity who will 
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occupy an idealised position of not too early or too late, not too scared but not 
sealed over. This stabilization discourse also potentiates a means of denying 
the patient access to therapy due to the fact they are ‘in crisis’ and therefore 
‘not ready’ However, as described in this extract it is not as simple as denying 
access to those in crisis but more creating such a narrow window of possibility 
that very few patients will be able to access therapy on a ward, thus enabling 
the psychologists to manage their resources. 
 
Extract: 10 
 
P6FP:…Erm ((4)) I guess how much they were willing to think about 
stuff. Yeah, I think (.) erm (.) how vulnerable they were willing to allow 
themselves to be and how robust they were to manage that as well. 
(349-351).  
 
Participant six describes a ‘ready’ subject who is “vulnerable” and is yet “robust” 
at the same time. Again this discursive construction functions to position a 
subject who must occupy a very precisely delineated position that is just right. In 
order to access therapy, therefore, the ‘ready’ subject must not only occupy a 
position in time and space, they must be ‘willing’ to allow themselves to occupy 
contrasting internal states in a delicate balance in order to ‘manage’ therapy.  
 
In summary, this section has analysed the data by attending to constructs 
around the various constructions of “readiness” as relating to rationality, 
resources, as being “polluted” by madness and as requiring a “stabilized” 
position, which is access through paradoxical requirements which cannot be 
met whilst the subject is an inpatient on the ward. Within the power-knowledge 
nexus, participants constructing an ideal, neoliberal subject who, internalizing 
the objects, truths and norms of psychiatry and psychology can then be 
moulded into an object of intervention by professionals: they are ‘ready’ for 
therapy. Therapy and the ‘ready’ therapeutic subject are positioned by the 
participants as reason whilst the space they occupy - a state of madness in a 
psychiatric ward - is positioned as unreason. Participants responses to these 
dichotomies, by engaging in disciplining practices, will be attended to in the 
following section 3.2. 
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3.2  Disciplining Practices: Clinician’s Constructions of Unreadiness as 
a Tool for Supporting the Expert Position.  
 
This section will draw upon two common threads in clinicians’ construction of 
readiness as a tool for supporting the expert position: constructions of 
‘presentation’ on the ward as enabling deployment of power at the level of 
surveillance; and negotiations of subjectivity and resistance within the ward 
environment. These constructions will be linked to the processes of disciplinary 
and pastoral power as mechanisms of subjectification which aim to construct a 
rational subject. 
 
3.2.1 “Presentation” on the Ward 
 
Extract: 11 
 
P3FCP:…But if someone can’t kind of, really have any sort of meaningful 
conversation, then it is obviously very hard to do an assessment. So if 
someone’s very thought-disordered or if they’re chaotic or if someone’s a 
bit manic and they’re sort of up and down out of the chair and in and out 
of the room, then you know, then you just think well actually let’s just 
wait, there’s just no point so, yeah, more how they present on the ward 
really would, kind of, negate me meeting with them. Yeah. (345-351). 
 
Observation or the concept of the ‘gaze’ (Foucault, 1963) is relevant here and 
can be described as a disciplinary technology in which the professional 
disciplines themself and others through coding behaviour. In observing “how 
they present on the ward” processes of subjectification are functioning to 
construct both the clinician as observer and patient as observed. Disciplinary 
technologies of surveillance, as explicated in Foucault’s depiction of the 
Panopticon, here demonstrate the functioning of power-knowledge relations on 
the ward. What constitutes a “meaningful conversation” is decided by the 
psychologist through normalising technologies of observation and assessment. 
The clinician thus defines both normality and abnormality through coding and 
classification. As Newnes (2011) notes: clinical psychologists, as the servants 
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of psychiatry, “perform a powerful social function. The are the guardians of what 
is to be considered normal” (Newnes, 2011). The patient must then internalise a 
permanent self-surveillance, and thus self-disciplining in order to constitute 
themselves in relation to norms expected of the ‘ready’ for therapy subject.  
 
Extract: 12 
 
P2MCP:…So it’s the kind of way some people might present on the ward 
(()) and you really think: is this the right thing at this time, so… 
RR Mmmhmm. So what kind of things would that be?  
P2 Erm, I guess, you know, what like we’ve, some people who might be 
quite sort of delusional. Um and might be, you know, confronting anyone 
that walks past them, and all of the content of their speech is linked um 
linked to those sort of delusions and there isn’t really any capacity to sort 
of have any other sort of conversation .(447-461). 
 
In this extract the clinician constructs the ‘unready’ patient as a subject who 
does not have the “capacity to sort of have any other sort of conversation”. 
“Delusions” are categorized as pathological and thus become a barrier to 
accessing therapy, silencing the experience of the patient, who must adhere to 
expected ‘norms’ in order to access therapy. The power relations here are clear: 
the psychologist positioned as ‘expert’ deploying knowledge which constructs 
what content is valid for discussion in therapy. According to Foucault (1982), 
expert knowledges can be considered to define which behaviours are normal, 
acceptable or deviant.  Expert knowledges are underpinned by scientific truths 
which function to define norms; a set of socially accepted behaviours. Deviation 
from these norms are used to alert us to ‘dysfunction’ or ‘pathology’ such as 
‘delusions’. Through the disciplining technology of surveillance of ‘presentation’ 
on the ward the clinician constructs themselves, through processes of 
subjectification as ‘expert’. The patient’s subjectification as ‘unready’ supports 
this position with the problem located internally to them rather than in the 
therapy, for which they are ‘unready’.  
 
Extract: 13 
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P6FP:…Erm ((5)) so the lady that I referred who I thought was ready, it 
was in  a ward-round setting and I remember feeling quite, quite, I mean 
ward rounds are a quite difficult set-up, erm (.) and we were asking 
patients to talk about lots of stuff in a, in a packed room sometimes of 
lots of unfamiliar faces. (39-43).  
 
In this extract ward round practices can be seen functioning as a technology of 
power. Patients are expected to adhere to conventions of the psy-complex. In 
this case talking about personal information in a “packed room of unfamiliar 
faces”. This discourse of ‘ability/willingness to discuss personal matters openly’ 
can be seen to be to normalize this expectation in the context of inpatient 
settings, positioning the clinicians as ‘experts’ observing and assessing the 
patient in ward round, demarcating power-knowledge relations. In this 
‘technology of citizenship’ (Rose, 1990) the subject is expected to lay bare their 
inner self or soul to a professional thus enabling the idea of the confessional or 
of pastoral power to function freely (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 2014).  
 
Foucault (1982) asserts that individualizing power finds its modern-day 
manifestation in pastoral power, a process of promoting the transformation of 
the subjectivity of others. Once found solely within the church and now found in 
a plethora of secularized contexts, salvation is offered by taking care of an 
individual’s health and well-being. Intrinsic to pastoral power is the technology 
of the confessional. Pastoral power “cannot be exercised without knowing the 
inside of people’s minds, without exploring their souls, without making them 
reveal their innermost secrets. It implies a knowledge of the conscience and an 
ability to direct it” (Foucault, 1982, p. 783). Thus the cost of care of the ‘soul’ is 
confession of one’s innermost thoughts and feelings. (Foucault, 1982).  
 
In the above three extracts what is being described appears to be the ‘rules of 
the game’ in relation to observation of ‘presentation’ on the ward and decisions 
around readiness for therapy. Below the participants construct what happens 
when someone choses not to play the game, to not talk in ward round or to not 
talk in the expected way in therapy. These opportunities for resistance will be 
explored in the following section as well as the results of resistance in these 
contexts. 
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3.2.2 Unreadiness and Resistance 
 
Extract: 14 
 
P9MCP:…When someone is psychotic and aggressive to their family 
and blame the family for many of the things that are going on, and we 
feel that that’s not based in reality. I mean it’s quite difficult to say, but. 
And they feel they’ve been locked up totally against their will, that they 
don’t have a problem of any sorts, whether it’s anxiety or. Their problem 
is their family, are their problem. Then it’s very difficult for us to have a 
collaborative goal. (1032-1038). 
 
Here expert knowledge is deployed through a biomedical discourse to construct 
what is considered ‘reality’. If the patient attempts to resist these biomedical 
discourses by, for example, asserting that “their family are their problem” they 
are labelled as “psychotic” and “aggressive”. These discourses lie in direct 
relation to how therapy is being constructed and what is appropriate therapy. 
The construction of the “collaborative goal” which, in cognitive behavioural 
therapy, is seen as a primary agent of change, is of interest in relation to the 
subjectification of the unready patient. “Collaborative empiricism” is used to 
“uncover” patients’ automatic thoughts and underlying beliefs (Dattilio & Hanna, 
2012) with the patient required to recognise and modify their “faulty cognitions”. 
These therapeutic technologies of power construct the client as a neo-liberal 
subject who should be able to self-regulate. As Smail (2011) articulates: 
“psychological distress arises not from the injuries inflicted by a material social 
environment, but from the desires and fantasies (and more recently, from the 
faulty cognitions) of individuals themselves” (p. 233).  Psychology is thus 
complicit in disciplining technologies, which create neo-liberal subjects and 
maintain the functioning of society. If the patient wants access to therapy they 
must be able to create a “collaborative goal” with the psychologist but seemingly 
one which must based on the psychologists’ and the teams’ version of reality in 
which the patient is “psychotic” and unwell thus locating their distress internally, 
rather than in the family or any other factors such as poverty, abuse or 
inequality. Power-knowledge relations function here result in the patient then 
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being denied therapy as they are resisting medicalised discourses, blaming 
something outside themselves. 
 
Extract: 15 
 
 P3FCP:…And there was a guy who was quite sort of passive aggressive. 
[…] So when I asked him a question he’d sort of put it back on me, like: 
“Well, what do you think? I mean what do you expect?” And erm, and 
then was going “Mmmm, yeah” you know, sort of looking at me you know 
in a really sarcastic, sort of, this really sarcastic smile on his face, “that’s 
an interesting question” and he just […] so just his manner and I, I guess 
that’s another example of how, you know, someone I wouldn’t see 
because they just weren’t able to, sort of engage, it’s more about his 
presentation at that point in time and I don’t know whether, when he’s 
less unwell, you know, he’d be more amenable, but that was kind of I 
suppose what I thought. You know he was quite hostile, he was 
someone who had a diagnosis of bipolar disorder and he was quite 
manic at the time and I just thought it’s that kind of manic edge you know 
when someone isn’t happy manic, they’re kind of, edgy manic you know 
it was that kind of situation. I thought well you don’t want to talk to me. 
You’re erm finding this obviously a very difficult, I guess I sort of 
interpreted his reaction to me as sort of like a like a defensive reaction. 
[…] Yeah, yeah. It was definitely sort of like trying to get control, you 
know, “I’m not going to be asked questions, I’m going to be the one 
asking the questions” you know, so er, yeah, I just kind of thought, I’m on 
a bit of a hiding to nothing on this one. (375-412). 
 
Here we can observe the interdependence of power and resistance. As 
Foucault wrote “Where there is power, there is resistance” (Foucault, 1978a, 
p.95). For Foucault in power, as an unstable network of practices rather than a 
deterministic system of dominating constraints, resistance is always present 
(Oksala, 2016), “yet or rather consequently, this resistance is never in a position 
of exteriority to power” (p. 95). The patient can be seen as “trying to get control” 
by positioning themselves as “the one asking the questions” a position typically 
occupied by the clinician. This attempt at resistance is constructed by the 
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clinical psychologist as “hostile” and “passive aggressive”, perpetuating the 
process of analytic control: pathologising or psychologizing by “interpreting” his 
resistance as “a defensive reaction” and linking this to his being “unwell”. The 
resistance is thus interpreted as being “unready” to engage in therapy.  
 
This raises questions about the use of ‘unready’ as a label for those who are 
resisting being positioned and attempting to hold agency in the therapeutic 
space. The concept of docile utility is apposite here. “Discipline produces 
subjected and practiced bodies, 'docile' bodies” (Foucault, 1975, p. 138-9) or in 
this case ‘docile minds’. RFT is being discursively constructed here as linked to 
being “amenable” and ”less unwell”. The construction of mental illness is linked 
to a biddable and controllable subject who will conform to neoliberal principles 
and aims when they are “well”.  Encapsulating the concept of docile utility 
therefore, the clinician is constructing a ‘ready’ subject who will conform to the 
norms of therapy, and “engage”, and not one who is resisting the subject 
position of ‘patient’, ‘client’ or ‘analysand’. She proceeds to label his resistance 
within this biomedical discourse as a “manic edge” and to take the decision that 
he is not ‘ready’ for therapy. Again the concept of ‘unreadiness’ is used to 
support the expert subject position of the clinician. 
 
In summary, this section has presented and analysed the data by attending to 
constructions of ‘readiness’ as relating to disciplining practices occurring on the 
ward. These processes of disciplinary and pastoral power, support the expert 
position of the clinician and maintain their construction as a subject who, within 
the power-knowledge nexus, holds the capacity to make decisions around 
readiness for, and therefore access to, therapy. Participants constructed a 
‘ready’ therapeutic subject who is normalized and one who does not engage in 
any form of resistance. In stepping back and examining the effects of sections 
3.1 and 3.2 it becomes apparent that the participants are constructing a subject 
who cannot be ready in the context of an inpatient acute ward. In section 3.3 the 
question will be posed: how, despite these above constructions, does the 
clinician construct themselves as an ethical subject? 
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3.3  The Ethical Clinician: Constructions Of Practice In Relation To 
‘Readiness’ And Macrostructures Of Governmentality 
 
This section will consider how clinicians constructed themselves as an ethical 
subject in relation to RFT. Having located the responsibility for readiness firmly 
in the patient, clinicians also allocate responsibility for non-readiness for and 
non-access to therapy outside themselves, as being in relation to wider systems 
operating at the ‘macro’ level such as service structures of inpatient settings, 
NICE guidance and constructions of therapy itself. In this section 
governmentality and Foucault’s concept of the ethical fourfold, will be drawn 
upon to examine the context within which these subjectivities and practices are 
made possible and seen as reasonable.  
 
3.3.1. Services and NICE as a Barrier to ‘Readiness’ in Acute Inpatient Settings 
The following extracts exemplify constructions of services and guidelines in 
relation to readiness and access to therapy in the acute setting. The extracts 
exemplify the many ways in which the clinicians constructed ‘services’, through 
a variety of different understandings, for example: service structure, length of 
admission, clinical legislation e.g. NICE guidelines and provision of psychology 
staff. A particular effort is made to justify therapy not being provided in these 
settings, reallocating responsibility at the macrostructural level, with ‘services’ 
constructed as an obstacle to their ability to provide therapy. These 
constructions are viewed through the lens of enabling clinicians to construct 
themselves as an ethical subject despite not providing therapy. 
 
Extract: 16 
 
P1MCP:…There’s not often time to offer people a, a course, so to speak, of 
therapy whilst they’re here. Erm. I mean I think (.) what I feel is that the big gap 
is that, yeah, we can do things with people while they’re here and try our best to 
help but it’s not a continuous thing. In an ideal world we would be able to pick 
people up here and then carry on seeing them and then offer them a full course 
of whatever it might be. That’s the real gap I think, that we’re not able to do that 
at the moment because it’s just, that doesn’t really fit with how services are 
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organized. […] If you look at NICE guidance or whatever it’s very much like, 
you, if you start something in the acute period you should then be able to 
continue it through and that’s, that’s the gap that we’ve got. It’s not that between 
us we couldn’t deliver you know a fairly reasonable range, erm, but yeah. It’s 
the continuing bit that’s tricky I think. […] Between my colleague and I we cover 
erm (.) oh, one, two, three, four, five, six wards and two home treatment teams. 
So actually yes, for all that we can do various things there’s a, a very low 
chance that you’re going to meet us overall. So, I mean, the reality still is that 
most people who pass through the hospital here or the home treatment team 
are not having access to any sort of psychological therapy. (374-396; 424-433). 
 
Participant one constructs his provision of therapy as being in line with NICE 
guidelines. NICE guidance, initiated by the government in 1999, as representing 
the gold standard of medical practice, can be seen as fundamentally shifting the 
regulatory relationship between the state and NHS professionals who then have 
increasing levels of surveillance and control applied to them and their practice 
(Flynn, 2002). Adoption of these clinical guidelines, with their adherence to 
‘evidence-based treatments’, can be seen in relation to processes of 
governmentality in which the participant has internalised a conscious 
awareness of surveillance, implemented via such processes as audit, 
inspection, observation and evaluation. This enables social control to be 
implemented as the participant self-regulates in such a way that they are 
concordant with clinical guidance in order to avoid penalty.  
The operation of evidence-based healthcare in this context aligns therapy to 
biomedical discourses with the clinical psychologist implicitly positioned as a 
‘scientist practitioner’: consumer, evaluator and producer of science 
(Stoltenberg & Pace, 2007). Scientific knowledge is thus privileged and 
deployed within the power-knowledge nexus to construct a form of ‘best 
practice’ in line with economic and biomedical discourses. 
 
Therapy is constructed here as requiring time, a “full course”. Additionally, the 
requirement for therapy to be a “continuous thing”, is stipulated within NICE 
guidelines (British Psychological Society, 2012). The reference to the “acute 
period” by participant one is linked to an impossibility of being able to “carry it 
through” highlighting the role of service structure and length of admissions in 
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this equation. Therapy is constructed, therefore, as something that is 
incompatible with macro-structures such as NICE and length of admission. 
Deploying NICE guidelines, service structure and construction of therapy within 
biomedical discourses of evidence-based practice, enables the psychologist to 
talk about the reasons why he is not providing therapy in an apparently 
unproblematic way. By enabling the functioning of power-knowledge relations at 
the level of the institution and of governmental guidelines, participant one is 
able to construct himself as an ethical subject; one, functioning within these 
processes of governmentality, who would provide therapy if service structures 
and guidelines allowed him to. Here the subjectivity being formed could be seen 
in line with Foucault’s conceptualisation of the second component of the ethical 
fourfold – Mode of Subjection (Deontology) as one in which the individual is 
permitted to perceive their actions as worthy of moral valorization by 
establishing their relation to the moral code and recognising themselves as 
bound to act according to it; judging the morality of an action based on rules 
rather than consequences of an action or, in this case, non-action.  
 
Extract: 17 
 
P10FP:…Er, I don’t think we have enough therapy and psychological 
support provided in the ward and in a sense that probably is the type of 
the ward I’m working on, it’s an assessment unit. So patients that come 
there are so disturbed. Most of them are under section. Erm, probably 
have high risk in terms that they’ve attempted suicide. They’d be 
medically erm unwell also because of erm the incident and they might be 
in a full-blown psychotic or manic episode, that one week or two weeks 
that they stay with us doesn’t give them and doesn’t give us enough time 
to help them slightly improve so they could be reasonably considered for 
psychological therapy. But for people who are less disturbed and, yes, 
there has been some previous history before coming to hospital and er 
their episode is not as significant in the sense of risk 
RR Mmmhmm? 
P10 Or in the sense of erm severe psychosis or mania er then in that case we 
involve the psychologist, probably after a week or two of being in the 
ward. But for patient who remains acutely disturbed (.) sometimes it’s 
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very difficult to, to engage with psychology. And probably the 
assessment ward is the ward that has (.) less psychology support. Not 
because the psychologists are not available but it’s the profile of the 
ward. The work we do that doesn’t give us enough time to engage 
everyone in psychological work. (618-640). 
 
Here we can see the structure of services being constructed as something 
antithetical to therapeutic work, which is again constructed as something 
requiring time. The psychiatrist here describes an average stay of two weeks on 
the assessment ward, highlighting that this “doesn’t give us enough time to help 
them slightly improve so they could be reasonably considered for psychological 
therapy”. Through these constructions the psychiatrist also constitutes herself 
as an ethical subject who would be referring people for therapy if there were 
enough time for them to improve slightly so that they could be “reasonably 
considered” for therapy; or if they were ”less disturbed” or not “manic” or 
“psychotic”. Discourses of ‘stabilization’ and ‘distress’ (cf. Nykličel and Denollet, 
2009; Schneider & Klauer, 2001; Derisley & Reynolds, 2000; Moore, Tambling 
& Anderson, 2013) and of ‘rationality’ (Henriques et al, 1998a) preceding RFT 
have been discussed in section 3.1. However we can see here that the reason 
for not providing therapy is located both in the service/ward structure and 
organisation and in the patient who is “manic” or “psychotic” and “high risk” 
could not, whilst on an assessment ward, be “reasonably” considered for 
therapy; with “people who are less disturbed” being more likely to be 
considered. Again the organization of service structures is used to justify 
inaction. Professional ‘norms’ of what happens in an ‘assessment’ unit as 
opposed to a ‘treatment’ unit are deployed, thus constructing service structures 
as instrumental barriers that the participant cannot do anything about. The 
internalization of these service ‘norms’, together with risk and diagnosis, again 
means that the subjectification of the psychiatrist is that of an ethical subject 
who would ideally like to enable access to therapy but does not due to the rules 
surrounding best practice. Responsibility is shifted elsewhere and she remains 
able to construct herself as an ethical practitioner.  
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In the above extracts processes of subjectification resulted in clinicians’ 
constructions of themselves as an ethical subject, unable to be flexible in order 
to deliver therapy because they are bound by governmental processes of 
regulatory power. This process has two outcomes: to state how therapy should 
be constructed, and to enable the clinician to refuse therapy as, according to 
NICE it can only be applied in a certain way in certain contexts. Section 3.3.2 
will further elucidate the participants’ constructions of therapy and their 
implications for RFT.  
 
3.3.2 Clinicians’ Constructions of Therapy in an Acute inpatient Setting.  
The participants’ constructions of therapy implied it as a positive entity, 
something that, in an ideal world, patients would want and which should be 
provided. At the same time, the majority of participants constructed therapy in 
ways which appear to be antithetical to these ideas: as “an undertaking”, 
”difficult” or “scary”, something which “stirs things up” or might ”exacerbate the 
situation” or make the patient more “prone and vulnerable to past emotions” and 
which may increase risk. Additionally, the majority of participants constructed 
therapy as something in which the ‘ready’ subject should be able to “sit in a 
room for an hour and talk”, implying a certain, verbal type of ‘ready’ subject. 
These discursive constructions can be seen to function through processes of 
governmentality, pastoral power and the technology of the confessional 
(Foucault, 1982), constructing therapy as a fixed entity that the subject needs to 
transform toward in order to be ‘ready’ for.  
 
3.3.2.1 The talking cure: Looking back to extract three the clinical psychologist 
makes the statement “…if you’re going to sit with somebody for an hour and they 
cannot speak to you well then that’s probably not going to get you anywhere”. In 
extract eleven the clinician constructs an unready subject who is “sort of up and 
down out of the chair and in and out of the room”. These constructions of therapy, 
as we have seen, fundamentally rest on the capability and motivation to use 
language and to abide by social conventions of therapy sessions. Psychology as a 
‘talking therapy’ a term with its roots in Freud’s ‘talking cure’ is inherently 
dependent on language which is seen by classical metaphysics, as an attribute 
specific to mankind and what it means to be human. The ability to convey verbal 
accounts of distress to the clinician constructs a ‘ready’ subject as a unitary, 
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individual subject with a core inner self that can be accessed, or not, depending on 
their ability and motivation to speak to the psychologist; a subject who is the object 
of psychological theorising and intervention (Venn, 1998); an individual with a ‘true’ 
inner self, which can be accessed through personal efforts.  The ability to sit in a 
room for an hour and talk, further links to constructions of Western social 
conventions of therapy. As Rose (1996) explicates: these ‘codes of knowledge’ are 
not accessed purely via introspection but ‘by rendering one’s introspection in a 
particular vocabulary of feelings, beliefs, passions, desires, values…according to a 
particular explanatory code derived from some source of authority’ (p 32).  
Historically and in other contexts, for example this construction of readiness 
requiring the subject who can “sit in a room and talk for an hour”, might have been 
discursively deployed as the ability to ‘lie on a couch’ and ‘free associate’ for an 
hour.  
 
3.3.2.2 “A difficult process” 
 
Extract: 18 
 
P2MCP:…Mm hm. Well I guess that therapy is a sort of significant (.) 
undertaking. Um and, erm. Patients kind of can kind of come to therapy with 
all sorts of expectations and ideas about what it might be about. Um, and, I 
guess it’s ((2)) that sort of, you meet and think about their situation, and you 
kind of, you offer what you’re able to offer. […] Erm, (.) so, sometimes 
people might come with, sort of, expectations that you’re going to somehow 
going to sort it all out.  And that it’s not necessarily a process that they’re 
going to be engaged with. It’s actually going to be quite difficult for them. 
You know, it might lead them to talk about difficult things they might not want 
to talk about, or stir up difficult emotions […] (363-396). 
 
In relation to RFT, the ready subject is constructed as one who is therefore 
‘ready’ to talk about “difficult things” and that this will be a “process that they’re 
going to be engaged with”, not something where the psychologist is “somehow 
going to sort it all out”. These constructions intersect on two levels. Firstly the 
construction of therapy as “a process” as “difficult” or as something which could 
“stir up difficult emotions” is built upon ideas of therapy which require the 
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subject to “go through” certain processes such as revisiting their childhood, the 
‘reliving’ of traumatic experiences as a means of ‘processing’ the trauma, 
working on identifying and changing entrenched ‘dysfunctional’ thinking 
patterns, or examining ‘unconscious processes’. The ‘ready’ subject is therefore 
one who needs to be ready for these specific formats or models of therapy; 
models developed with a middle-class ‘neurotic’ population as opposed to the 
diverse ‘psychotic’ populations found in acute inpatient wards. Secondly the 
psychologist’s refuting of the patient’s expectation that they are “somehow 
going to sort it all out” aligns the psychologist with a position whereby it is 
constructed as being the patient’s responsibility to work on him or her self. The 
processes of subjectification here construct a subject with an inner core that is 
discoverable through therapy. This construction is in line with psychology’s 
adoption of the positivist, empirical approach; used to establish its scientific 
status and align itself to the biomedical model. It is, as such, rooted in the 
historical processes and ideologies of the Enlightenment and structured around 
such dualisms as Mind-Body, or Society-Individual, representing a Western 
cultural bias (Cromby, 2006). With distress located within the individual and 
constructed as illness to be ‘cured’, the subject is thus expected to work on 
transformation towards a productive and self-regulating neoliberal subject, 
through technologies of the self. In this ‘”technology of citizenship” (Rose, 1990, 
p. 227) the subject is expected to lay bare their inner self or soul to a 
professional thus enabling the idea of the confessional or of pastoral power to 
function freely by guaranteeing supposedly proper mental hygiene throughout 
the population (Hansen, McHoul & Rapley, 2003). The ‘ready’ subject is 
therefore one who approaches therapy, functioning within the technology of the 
‘confessional’ (Foucault, 1982), prepared that it will be a “significant 
undertaking” and is willing to talk to the therapist “about difficult things they 
might not want to talk about” as a necessity for the therapist as the professional 
to whom they will “reveal their innermost secrets” (Foucault, 1982).  
 
Extract: 19 
 
P10FP:…And (.) we didn’t feel at the time that working on some 
psychological therapy about losses she had in the past and some other 
promiscuous behaviour she had when she had manic episodes would 
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help. Probably would exacerbate the situation a bit further. And I didn’t 
feel that that would be the right time to exacerbate the situation of a high-
risk patient like that. […] So we thought, well I thought that engaging her 
((2)) with psychology or with treatment that will make her more erm (.) 
prone and erm more vulnerable to past emotions and erm (.) things that 
she didn’t want to discuss and was minimising for years and years and 
years, was not suitable in this erm high-risk situation. (911-923). 
 
In this extract therapy is, again, constructed in line with Western cultural biases 
around exposure to difficult memories and emotions: as something which is 
about “losses in the past”, with the potential to “exacerbate the situation further” 
and psychology as a “treatment with will make her more prone and more 
vulnerable”. The “high-risk patient” would thus be exposed to “to past emotions” 
and things she had been “minimising for years and years and years”. The 
psychiatrist in extract nineteen also constructs the type of patient in this 
description as “manic” and “high-risk”. This connection of madness and risk 
functions as a powerful discourse within mental health as a rationale for the 
need to control and confine. In this case the subject is constructed as unready 
due to these reasons and therefore does not have access to therapy. Within 
these constructions of therapy as exposure to difficult emotions, the clinicians’ 
again enter into self-disciplining technologies of power: their constructions of 
themselves as ethical subjects continues to be present as practitioners who are 
not exposing the patient to these experiences as they are “vulnerable” and it is 
not “the right time to exacerbate the situation”.  
 
This section has attended to processes of governmentality and pastoral power 
enabling subjectification of the clinicians as ethical practitioners. Constructions 
of ‘services’, ‘NICE’ and ‘therapy’ intersect to act as barriers to the patient being 
able to access therapy as they cannot be considered ‘ready’ within these 
parameters. The discussion chapter will provide a summary and evaluation of 
this research and offer recommendations for clinical research and practice.   
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CHAPTER FOUR: DISCUSSION 
 
 
This chapter will summarise the main outcomes from the analysis. The research 
will then be evaluated with attention to coherence, rigour, sensitivity to context, 
transparency and reflexivity (Yardley, 2008). Finally the implications of the 
research for future research and clinical practice will be considered.   
 
4.1. Research Questions and Analysis Summary 
 
The research focused on three questions: 
 
• How do clinicians construct their understanding of the concept of 
readiness for therapy? 
• How is the discourse around readiness for therapy functioning in 
inpatient services? 
• How does the construct of ‘ready’ or ‘not ready’ position someone in 
relation to inequalities in access to therapy and what are the potential 
consequences? 
 
4.1.1 How Do Clinicians Construct Their Understanding of the Concept of 
Readiness for Therapy? 
Broadly RFT was constructed in relation to criteria required from a therapeutic 
subject who was constructed, through processes of normalisation and 
subjectification, as needing to occupy a subject position of ‘ideal therapeutic 
subject’. Processes of subjectification of the ideal ‘ready’ subject occurred 
through two processes: the positioning of the subject as rational and resourced 
and the discourse of stabilisation - both constructed as prerequisites for RFT. 
 
 4.1.1.1 Rationality, resources and ‘pollution’: The ‘ready’ subject was 
constructed by the clinicians as possessing ‘insight’, which was in itself 
positioned as being concurrently a prerequisite for therapy but also a potential 
outcome of therapy. I have argued that ‘insight’ functions as a technology of 
power, directly implicating psychology as part of the psy-complex (Rose, 1990) 
as having the potential to ‘achieve socially desirable objectives through the 
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disciplining of human differences’ (Louw, 2005). I also argued that a 
‘responsibilization’ (Rose, 1999) discourse functioned to construct  the ideal 
‘ready’ subject in line with David’s (1990) criteria describing ‘insight’: willingness 
to label experiences as pathological, acceptance of mental illness and 
agreement with treatment (David, 1990). The ideal ‘ready’ subject constructed 
by the participants can be seen to be ‘rational’ and responsibilised through 
technologies of the self, adhering to the truths and norms of psychiatry and 
psychology in order to be considered ready for therapy. Further, madness, or 
‘thought disorder’ is constructed as ‘polluting’ to the therapeutic interaction, a 
powerful discursive positioning which constructs the ‘unready’ subject as 
someone who is to be confined, not treated (or at least not by therapy), and as 
a threat to rationality. This can be seen in relation to Foucault’s descriptions of 
the shift in understanding of and treatment of madness in the mid-17th century 
as falling outside the spectrum of what was considered human and linked to the 
need for confinement. Processes of subjectification could be seen to position 
the clinicians as gatekeepers of therapy as a resource. Alignment with the 
version of reality provided by professionals, positioned as ‘common sense’ 
(Miller and McClelland, 2010), was required, implying the exclusion of those 
who do not adhere to norms of rationality. Within an inpatient setting the 
implications for access to therapy are startling: the construction of the subject 
as ‘too disturbed’ may refer to any number, if not the majority, of patients 
admitted to the ward. This subject-positioning can be seen in relation to 
constructions of ‘distress’ in relation to RFT in the literature (Nykličel and 
Denollet, 2009; Schneider & Klauer, 2001; Derisley & Reynolds, 2000; Moore, 
Tambling & Anderson, 2013).These discourses of exclusion can be seen as 
reflected in the absence of literature in this area, as noted in the literature 
review; and thus the exclusion of the patient in these settings, both materially 
and conceptually, from therapy.  
 
As outlined in the literature review, the ideal therapeutic subject was also 
constructed through a discourse of ‘personal resources’ including: intelligence, 
verbal agility and emotional strength (Heilbrun & Sullivan, 1982; Truant, 1999; 
Ogrodniczuk et al, 2009). I have argued here that the clinicians constructed a 
therapeutic subject who is, in many ways, like them: a white, middle-class, 
educated subject. Therapy, seen as a transforming technology of power would 
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make them ‘well’ and therefore ‘productive’, in line with neoliberal values. 
However, they do not have access to these transforming technologies as they 
do not fulfil the criteria of rationality and personal resources outlined by the 
clinicians. They do not have the ‘cultural capital’ (Bourdieu, 1986) required to 
gain access to therapy. 
 
4.1.1.2 ‘The Goldilocks Paradox’: The second major argument put forward in 
the analysis was that patients were also prevented from being constructed as 
‘ready’ due to the ‘goldilocks paradox’: a construction of RFT in which the 
subject who is a patient on an inpatient ward cannot be considered ‘ready’ due 
to timing, location and requirements for mutually exclusive internal states, 
echoing the literature which demonstrates contradictory findings on the role of 
‘distress’ in assessing for RFT (Nykličel and Denollet, 2009; Schneider & 
Klauer, 2001; Derisley & Reynolds, 2000; Moore, Tambling & Anderson, 2013). 
Disciplining practices can be understood in this context as a means of control of 
the patient who, through processes of subjectification, is expected to form 
themselves as an entity who will occupy an idealised position, creating such 
narrow conditions of possibility (Foucault, 1966) that very few patients will be 
assessed as being ready for therapy, thus enabling the psychologists to 
manage their resources. 
 
In summary, the clinicians can be seen to be managing accountability, creating 
an ideal subject who, in the context of the ward, is never going to meet the 
criteria for RFT. If they are then, due to being deemed ‘not ready’, denied 
access to those transforming technologies of the self, i.e. therapy, they are 
therefore left to other technologies present on the ward: those disciplining 
technologies: observation, surveillance and medication; described in the second 
discursive site, below. 
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4.1.2 How is the Discourse Around Readiness for Therapy Functioning in 
Inpatient Services? 
Constructions of RFT at the level of the ward environment saw disciplining 
practices of surveillance underpinning assessment of RFT. I have argued here 
that ‘unreadiness’ can be seen as a tool supporting the expert position of the 
clinicians. Constructions of ‘presentation’ on the ward could be seen as 
enabling deployment of power-knowledge relations at the level of surveillance; 
whilst negotiations of subjectivity and resistance within the ward environment 
were positioned as ‘unreadiness’ and pathologised by clinicians. Facets of 
disciplinary technology manifest through coding of behaviour and through 
processes of normalisation which constructed an ‘unready’ subject as one who 
does not behave according to the rules and norms of the ward and does not 
construct themselves as a regulated, neoliberal subject.  
 
A discourse of ‘ability/willingness to discuss personal matters openly’ could be 
seen to be deployed by the clinicians. The functioning of pastoral power via the 
technology of the confessional (Foucault, 1982) thus recruits the psy-complex 
as complicit in processes of governmentality, ensuring “mental hygiene” 
throughout the population (Rose, 1992). I have argued here that the patient is 
expected to demonstrate adherence to these conventions through clinical 
practices on the ward: conventions of therapeutic sessions in the case of 
psychology and conventions of the ward round in the case of psychiatry.  
 
Negotiations of subjectivity and resistance within the ward environment were 
also discursively deployed by the clinicians as pathologising potential attempts 
at resistance on the part of the patient. The implications for subjectivity can be 
seen through the lens of docile utility: constant surveillance inducing a 
psychological state of ‘conscious and permanent visibility’ (Foucault, 1975), 
internalised to construct a self-aware, self-regulating neoliberal subject. A docile 
body - or, in this case, mind - conforms to the norms of therapy, does not resist 
the subject position of ‘patient’, ‘client’ or ‘analysand’ and does not attempt to 
resist individualising discourses of illness and responsibilization (Rose, 1999; 
Patel, 2003). The power-knowledge relations implicated here thus depend on 
expert knowledge deployed to construct a reality in which the patient is in a 
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subjugated position and must adhere to the norms of the ward or be labelled 
‘unready’ and denied access to therapy.  
 
4.1.3 How Does The Construct Of ‘Ready’ Or ‘Not Ready’ Position Someone In 
Relation To Inequalities In Access To Therapy And What Are The Potential 
Consequences 
 
I have argued that, in inpatient settings, patients were also positioned as unable 
to access therapy due to macrostructural issues. Through technologies of the 
self (Foucault, 1988) these macrostructures: services, guidelines and therapy 
were discursively deployed to facilitate the clinicians’ subjectification of 
themselves as ethical practitioners, despite not providing therapy. The subject 
position of ‘ethical practitioner’ was understood as being constructed in relation 
to the second component of the ethical fourfold (Foucault, 1984a, 1984b): 
‘mode of subjection’. Judgement of ethical behaviour is, herein, based on 
adherence to rules rather than consequences of the behaviour, in this case: not 
providing therapy. Three discursive constructions: NICE guidelines, service 
structure and therapy intersect, functioning as regulatory power structures 
within processes of governmentality. These macrostructures are constructed as 
antithetical to one another: Service structures indicate that acute admissions 
are short - Patients will usually spend fewer than 90 days on an acute inpatient 
ward. Some areas sub-dividing acute wards into assessment/triage and short-
term admission with average stays of seven days and standard treatment wards 
with average stays ranging from 20 to 90 days (NHS Confederation, 2012; 
Williams et al, 2014), therapy is constructed as a long process, and both 
constructions on the part of the participants and  guidelines which state therapy 
should be continuous (NICE 2014). They are thus constructed as preventing the 
psychologist from being able to deliver therapy in acute inpatient services.  
 
Therapy was constructed by the clinicians via two discursive processes:  
as a difficult process requiring exposure to painful memories and emotions (cf, 
Hoffman, 1969); and as inherently dependent on language and the ability to 
convey verbal accounts of distress. The construction of therapy as inherently 
verbal could be seen to presuppose a ‘ready’ subject as a unitary, individual 
subject with a core inner self that can be accessed, or not, depending on their 
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ability and motivation to speak to the psychologist; a subject who is the object of 
psychological theorising and intervention (Venn, 1998); an individual with a 
‘true’ inner self, which can be accessed through personal efforts.  The ability to 
sit in a room for an hour and talk further links to constructions of Western social 
conventions of therapy, demonstrating the historically and culturally constructed 
nature of therapy. 
 
Through the technology of the confessional (Foucault, 1982), the ‘ready’ subject 
is constructed as willing to “reveal their innermost secrets” (Foucault, 1982). 
However, this can be seen to interact with discourses of risk whereby therapy 
as a ‘difficult process’ was positioned as potentially ‘destabilizing’ the patient. 
Self-disciplining technologies of power thus facilitate the clinicians’ 
constructions of themselves as ethical subjects, practitioners who are not 
exposing the patient to these difficult experiences of therapy as they are 
“vulnerable” and “risky”.  
 
The differences in power relationships in this environment mean that the 
clinician has more power and control over the client’s life than at any other point 
in mental health services  (Laugharne, Priebe, McCabe, Garland and Clifford, 
2012) whilst the patient is unable to seek support elsewhere. I argue that the 
consequences of these three discursive sites are to construct barriers to 
therapy through the processes of subjectification, disciplining practices and 
ethical technologies of the self with the result that patients in inpatient settings 
are unavoidably constructed as not ready for therapy and are consequently 
unable to access therapy.  With reduced funding and an absent research focus 
on therapy in inpatient services the impasse arising from these constructions of 
RFT, and ways out of the impasse, will be discussed in section 4.4.  
 
4.2. Evaluative Criteria  
 
Willig (2001) maintains that evaluation should be compatible with the 
epistemological approach of the research, further suggesting that Foucauldian 
discourse analysis is most usefully evaluated by “assessing the quality of the 
accounts they produce. Do they tell a good story? Do they tell a story which is 
clear, internally coherent and sufficiently differentiated? Does it generate new 
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insights for readers?” (p148).  Attention has been given, both in the analysis 
chapter and in the summary of findings, to demonstrating the links made 
between the data and my interpretations in order to describe a clear and 
coherent story. In addition to this I will employ evaluative criteria drawn from 
Yardley’s (2008) framework, comprising: coherence, transparency and rigour 
and impact (Yardley, 2008). Issues of reflexivity will be addressed in section 
4.3. 
 
4.2.1 Coherence 
Coherence in qualitative research is considered by whether it is able to provide 
a clear and persuasive argument and whether this forms a congruent whole 
with the methods employed and their theoretical background. The interrelation 
of the theoretical approach, research question, methodology and analysis 
(Yardley, 2008) is therefore central: the grounding of the research questions in 
the epistemological stance and methodology of this study has been key in 
demonstrating a coherent approach to the research. Compatibility of language 
and method has been demonstrated in line with Yardley (2008) with attention to 
‘discursive constructions’, for example, as opposed to ‘findings’. The process of 
analysis was multilayered and iterative generating many possible avenues of 
exploration. Patterns were attended to at both micro and macro levels, attention 
to exceptions or ‘counter-discourses’ in the data further potentiating sensitivity 
to these patterns. The research questions have been revisited and summarised 
in relation to the literature and the overall argument of the thesis. Coherence of 
analysis and assimilation of the literature has been demonstrated through 
attention to the three discursive sites - presenting the multifarious constructions 
of RFT in order to provide clarity on the connections between the extracts and 
the discursive constructions. 
 
4.2.2 Transparency and Rigour 
Several processes enabled rigour in the conduction of this research. Use of 
memories as data (Haug, 1987), enabled an in-depth engagement with the 
topic, both by participants and researcher, pre and during the interview process. 
Immersing myself in the literature of Foucault and associated thinkers, as well 
as seeking out research supervisors who had extensive knowledge of FDA, 
enabled me to ground the research in the conceptual and theoretical roots of a 
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Foucauldian approach to discourse analysis. Finally, attention to sensitivity to 
context18 and to epistemological and personal reflexivity 19 enabled an in-depth 
analytic process. 
Yardley (2008) suggests that transparency can be demonstrated by providing 
adequate detail of the methodology employed, including a ‘paper trail’, which 
documents the process of the research as having been carried out to a 
professional standard.20  
 
4.2.3 Limitations 
Recruitment of participants from a small group may have limited the diversity of 
the data. Starting processes of recruitment earlier may have enabled the 
researcher to recruit a more diverse professional population. Memory work 
(Haug, 1987; Crawford, Kippaz and Onyx, 1992) was only carried out partially.  
Had the interview process been started earlier it may have been possible to 
carry out the memory work more fully21 which would have produced additional 
in-depth data and may have resulted in more naturalistic conversations which 
would also have reduced my influence over the data as a researcher.  
 
4.3  Reflexivity 
 
4.3.1 Epistemological Reflexivity 
The epistemological position adopted in this research was aligned with both a 
social constructionist stance and with critical realism. Willig (1999) suggests that 
constructions available are dependent on historically and culturally available 
ways of understanding phenomena, and that understanding is therefore 
contextual (Willig, 1999). In reflecting on the epistemological position taken in 
this study it is necessary to consider the argument that adopting an ontologically 
realist stance which is underpinned by epistemological relativism could lead to 
inconsistent applications in relation to which objects and subject are reified and 
which are not (Speer, 2007). The importance of accounting for the material 
effects of discursive constructions was acknowledged by the use of a 
Foucauldian discourse analysis and could be seen to address these criticisms: 
                                                          
18 See section 2.6.2.5 for further information on sensitivity to context. 
19 Addressed in section 4.4 
20 See Appendix J for an example of the analysis forming part of the paper trail 
21 See Appendix K for a detailed description of the memory work method 
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critical realism, according to Parker (1992) acknowledges the material nature of 
the human world whilst asserting that understandings of the world and practices 
are constructed through language (Parker, 1992). An examination of the impact 
of professional constructions of RFT on both the patient and clinician was an 
integral part of the research questions of this thesis, and the adoption of an 
integrated critical realist, social constructionist, non-relativist stance enabled this 
process. It is important to acknowledge that my analysis is just one 
interpretation of the data and that this thesis is, in itself a discursive 
construction. It is important to highlight the potential impact of the interview 
process in and of itself on the data. Potentially my asking these questions of the 
participants could have put them on the spot so they were therefore taking a 
discursive position whereby they felt the need to justify or construct rationales 
for not providing therapy. The importance of a reflexive stance, both 
epistemologically and personally, is therefore central throughout the research 
process in acknowledging the impact of what I bring to the construction of this 
knowledge; for example, my positioning as ‘insider’ or ‘outsider’ in relation to the 
participants. 
 
4.3.2. Personal Reflexivity 
As already discussed in chapter two, a reflexive journal has been kept 
throughout the process of research. My clinical and research experience has 
informed how I have understood ideas around RFT. Personal reflexivity  
is integral to consideration of ‘good’ qualitative research in providing an account 
of how the research and the object of inquiry will have been shaped by the 
researcher (Willig, 2013). Throughout the research process I have reflected 
upon differing aspects: clinical, research and previous training, which may have 
influenced my construction of the data. 
It was noticeable how the clinical area of work I was undertaking whilst 
conducting my analysis impacted on my reading of the data. For example, 
working in a service that provides ‘treatment interventions’ to children who have 
experienced trauma, I found it challenging to extricate myself from clinical 
discourses of evidence base around ‘exposure’ as an integral and necessary 
aspect of treatment. Through discussion with my research supervisors and 
through use of my reflexive journal I was able to reposition my interpretation of 
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this material in alignment with the methodological approach taken in the study 
and to acknowledge the cultural and social construction of these assumptions.  
 
My previous training as a music therapist has permeated the research process - 
from the initial idea to explore the construct of RFT to my reading of the data 
and resultant analytic foci. My belief that therapy can and should be adjusted to 
meet the needs of the person using it, whether verbal or non-verbal, can 
therefore be seen to have underpinned this research.  
 
Finally, whilst I, unavoidably, had an impact in shaping and constructing the 
research, the research in itself and the process of interviewing professionals 
and analysing these interviews, has also shaped my understandings and view 
of therapy. From an initial position in which I was not particularly critical of 
therapy as a construct, seeing it as a positive and supportive process, I have 
been guided to more critical understandings of therapy through the analytic 
process and thought incorporation of critical concepts present in the literature 
such as the psy-complex (Rose, 1990) and the Foucauldian ideas underpinning 
the analysis. I feel that I have come away from this research with different 
understandings of therapy in and of itself, and can see its potential to be both a 
positive force and to be wielded as a technology of power (Foucault, 1975). I 
remain unchanged in my belief, however, that therapy can and should be 
adjusted to meet the needs and desires of those who wish to participate in it.  
 
4.4 Impact and Recommendations 
 
4.4.1 Implications for Future Research 
As highlighted in chapters one and three, although psychologists and other 
therapists are working in these services, there is an absence of literature on 
RFT in acute inpatient settings.  The dearth of research in this area serves to 
exclude madness from theoretical considerations of RFT in inpatient settings 
and perpetuates its exclusion from therapy itself. An absence of literature on 
RFT in inpatient settings could be one reason, alongside practical issues of 
funding and availability of therapies, why clinical and institutional guidelines 
(NICE 2009) are not being adhered to but instead have the potential to be 
employed to enable clinicians to manage their resources and accountability, 
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resulting in the potential for therapy not being accessed by the majority of those 
admitted to inpatient services. Within a realist epistemological framework there 
are understandable challenges in carrying out research on a heterogeneous 
population such as those found in acute inpatient settings. At the most basic 
level however, RFT in this context could be explored in relation to the 
therapeutic needs of those on the wards and not solely, as is represented in the 
literature, in relation to concurrent substance misuse issues (cf. Heesch, 
Velazquez & von Sternberg, 2005; Pantalon & Swanson, 2003).  
 
This is not to suggest, however, that research within a realist paradigm would 
be the recommended position for future research. Indeed, further qualitative 
research into the area of RFT or other of the related constructs such as 
psychological-mindedness or engagement would be crucial in counterbalancing 
the dominance of realist knowledge-claims currently privileged in this field. 
Further, future research could helpfully address the current positioning of 
alternative forms of therapeutic provision which position themselves as outside 
the realist associations of evidence base, for example, narrative and systemic 
approaches. Current expectations of evidence-based practice and outcome 
measures, aligned to a biomedical, realist stance towards knowledge 
generation, positions post-structuralist approaches at a disadvantage as they do 
not subscribe to the same epistemological or evaluative framework (Laugharne, 
1999). Additionally, therapeutic approaches with a relatively small and emerging 
body of research, for example the arts therapies, also occupy a non-privileged 
position in service provision. Research on therapeutic approaches which are 
able to adapt to the needs and abilities of the patients in inpatient settings would 
therefore be a valuable addition.  
 
Finally, and possibly most importantly, exploratory, participatory research to 
include patients admitted to acute inpatient wards would be a crucial element in 
exploring understandings of RFT from the patient’s perspective. Fundamentally, 
future research may need to step outside the Eurocentric constructions of 
therapy, and therein RFT, to explore non-linguistic ways of understanding 
distress and therapy. 
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4.4.2 Implications for Clinical Practice 
The construction of RFT as requiring an ideal subject who, even if they existed 
in an inpatient setting, would nonetheless be prevented from accessing therapy 
due to service structures and the constrictions of therapy, clearly has 
implications for clinical practice: in provision of and access to therapy . The 
question arises: How could someone be understood as ready for therapy when 
the institutional systems are in place to stop them, when the pathologising of the 
person is in place to stop them? And crucially: what might therapy for an 
‘unready’ or ‘mad’ person look like?  
 
The dominance of CBT in alignment with the biomedical framework has the 
effect of placing constrictions on the majority of clinicians working in clinical 
psychology. The origin of CBT can be seen within a Eurocentric and 
reductionist stance towards scientific knowledge, which considers that there are 
discoverable, objective truths located within the person (Boyle, 2011).   
In the context of RFT this positions the person as problematic and ‘unready’ 
rather than the therapeutic approach as unsuitable for the individual at that point 
in time. 
 
4.4.2.1 Alternative Therapeutic Approaches: Open Dialogue and the Arts 
Therapies: Cornish and Gillespie (2009) outline the scope for adopting a 
‘pragmatic’ approach reflecting pluralist, non-relativist, critical practice which is 
action-focused in its use of knowledge and is evaluated according to whether 
the interests of those using the approach are served. Additionally, the systemic 
position both/and (Burnham, 1992) could be usefully deployed here to explore 
avenues of practice within clinical psychology which would integrate the most 
beneficial aspects of diverse approaches. As discussed, the impetus to impose 
a certain version of reality on the patient can have negative impacts upon self-
identity (Beck-Sander, 1998). This study would recommend alternative 
approaches to therapy that do not pathologise the individual but instead listen to 
their meaning-making, even if this meaning-making is ‘unreasoned’. Open 
dialogue (Seikkula et al,1995) could be employed, enabling meaning to be co-
constructed between patient, family and professional and re-constructing 
‘psychosis’ as an attempt to communicate experiences where words are not yet 
possible (Stockman, 2015). In many respects open dialogue shares numerous 
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theoretical underpinnings with the arts therapies. Whilst each of the arts 
therapies (ATs) employs different techniques, the emphasis on non-verbal 
communication and creative processes as dialogue are central to all modalities. 
The understanding of processes of verbal communication as arising out of the 
early, pre-verbal caregiving relationship is also common to both open dialogue 
and music therapy. Based on the theoretical research of Vygotsky (1987) and 
Trevarthen (2017) The dialogue, begun immediately after birth, of facial 
expressions, verbalizations, movements and shared attention to the world is 
seen as forming a development of communication in which caregiver and baby 
begin to influence each other’s emotional states and behaviours. The 
development of language, in parallel with emotional development, is understood 
as a process in which the caregiver’s voice as gradually internalised by the 
child, eventually forming inner speech and ability to self-regulate. These 
conceptualisations of language development and emotional regulation serve 
several functions, which could be seen to be beneficial in inpatient settings and, 
more specifically in relation to RFT: 
Distress is understood as something that may not be able to be understood on 
a cognitive level or translated into words at that moment. Verbal communication 
is not a prerequisite for engagement and inclusion in the ‘treatment’. Finally the 
‘ready’ subject is understood as decentered and in relation to their context.  
 
Additionally, the use of different creative modalities of the AT’s, which 
admittedly contain their own conventions, would nonetheless support a shift 
away from a therapy which requires the ‘ready’ therapeutic subject to conform 
to Eurocentric conventions of sessions originating in the work of Freud, toward 
a more flexible approach which moves to meet the patient in a therapeutic 
space they can mould and direct according to their needs. 
 
4.4.2.2 The Power Threat Meaning Framework: A pragmatic approach may, 
however, potentially result in inconsistent strategies, which would not coherently 
resist bio-medical constructions of distress. The PTM framework could 
potentially be beneficially employed in inpatient services by providing an 
alternative way for patients and clinicians to talk about ‘emotional distress’ or 
‘troubled behaviour’; to understand and emphasise the link between these and 
social factors such as discrimination, inequality and poverty as well as adverse 
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experiences such as abuse and violence. The potential, through this alternative 
understanding could enable both clinicians and patients to reallocate ideas 
around blame, weakness, deficiency or mental illness through different 
narratives about people’s lives and difficulties (Johnstone & Boyle,  2018).  
 
The suggested questions which summarise the main conceptual aspects of the 
PTM framework could be helpfully employed in many arenas of inpatient 
services whether that be an initial meeting between clinical psychologist and 
patient or the discussions held in ward round. The questions include: 
 
• What has happened to you? (How is Power operating in your life?) 
• How did it affect you? (What kind of Threats does this pose? 
• What sense did you make of it? (What is the Meaning of these situations 
and experiences to you?) 
• What did you have to do to survive? (What kinds of Threat Response 
are you using?). 
(Johnson & Boyle, 2018) 
 
In relation to decisions around RFT this framework and line of questioning could 
aid in shifting the location of the problem and responsibility for ‘readiness’ to an 
external position, rather than situating them in the pathologised inpatient who 
cannot realistically meet these expectations and judgments. 
 
Implications relevant to psychiatric practice in relation to RFT could also make 
use of the PTM framework. Psychiatrists, in the position of referrer, may make 
implicit judgments around readiness based on their observations of patients and 
their ‘presentation’ at ward round which is a site of considerable disciplinary 
power. It has been described how patients can be positioned in the context of 
ward round with Duggins (2010) suggesting that patients attending ward rounds 
are characterised as “good patients” who are accepting of care plans or “difficult 
patients” who wish to discuss their distress and may question treatment 
rationale. Use of the above questions from the PTM framework could aid the 
psychiatrist and MDT to enable the patient in discussing their experiences in 
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different ways without the requirement to deploy ‘cultural capital’ (Bourdieu, 
1986) in aligning to a diagnostic worldview. 
 
4.4.2.3 Attention to Language: Linked to the differing constructions of 
therapeutic and psychiatric practice, attendance to language used both in 
assessments and in ward rounds would be significant in effecting change in the 
positioning of the patient. The importance of discourse in creating or 
maintaining ‘regimes of truth’ (Foucault, 1975) which are unhelpful is 
fundamental. The potential for creation of alternative, more helpful ‘truths’ thus 
rests on a shift in language away from individualizing, pathologising discourses. 
In line with the ‘pragmatism’ described above, a solution-focused approach, 
attending to the constructive power of language in our social realities (de 
Shazer et al, 2007) may be helpful in the search for alternative discourses. 
Additionally, training in differing modalities of communication may support 
alternative ways to conduct therapeutic sessions for clinical psychologists 
working within these settings, facilitating the clinician to move past an 
expectation for the patient to ‘sit in a room and talk for an hour’.  
 
4.4.3 Recommendations for Clinical Practice 
It should be acknowledged that the requirement to simultaneously comply with 
clinical guidance, whilst working in inpatients services and carrying out therapy 
as understood by the discourses and constructs present in this analysis, can be 
seen to result in a place of stuckness and possible stalemate for those clinicians 
working in these settings. A tentative conclusion to this dilemma could ask the 
question: is clinical psychology currently fit for purpose in these settings? And 
what can be done to in the professions of clinical psychology and of psychiatry 
to shift these practices? 
 
On a broad level, rather than requiring patients to fit into narrow conceptual and 
clinical boxes, clinical psychology and psychiatry could shift to a more flexible, 
culturally sensitive way of providing therapy allowing for different ways of 
working that fit the needs of the groups and individuals they are working with. 
This could include: 
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• Use of different therapeutic models should be formulation-led as 
opposed to rigidly applied, challenging realist notions of ‘validity’ in order 
to meet the needs of the patients in these settings and challenging 
diagnostic or biomedical constructions of distress. 
• The use of different models such as open dialogue (discussed above), 
trauma-focused work which acknowledges the potential root of difficulties 
associated with a diagnosis of psychosis (or complex trauma in the case 
of diagnosis of personality disorder) as located in a person’s context and 
life experiences, and narrative approaches which encourage meaning-
making within the individual’s context.  
• In asking questions about an individual’s readiness for therapy in 
inpatient settings, past experience of these settings should be thought 
about in collaboration by the clinical psychologist, the psychiatrist and the 
patient in a transparent way.  For example, meaning making, as 
mentioned above in relation to narrative approaches, has the potential to 
explore the context of a subject who is not able to ‘sit in a room and talk’ 
with the clinician. Silence within these settings could be supportively 
explored in the context of what it means to the patient to be silent. 
Potentially it is safer for them not to engage as previous experiences of 
talking or ‘engaging’ may have resulted in negative consequences such 
as being pathologised or placed under a section of the Mental Health 
Act.  Understandings of the possibility that ‘engagement’ could now feel 
unsafe for an individual in these contexts could help clinicians to support 
individuals in a meaningful way.  
• Psychologists should be politically active, aiming to influence change at a 
meta-level. This could encompass changes to both NICE guidelines and 
to the teaching of psychology at both undergraduate and doctoral levels: 
 
NICE Guidance 
NICE guidelines should be amended to reflect the length of stay in inpatient 
services and to enable clinicians to continue providing therapy post-discharge. 
Although it should be acknowledged that the construction of therapy as needing 
to be ‘continuous’ is simply one construction, it has also been found that 
patients can find it difficult having to tell their story repeatedly to multiple 
professionals (Biringer, Hartveit Sundfør Ruud & Borg, 2017). Additionally, the 
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NICE guidelines for schizophrenia and psychosis currently recommend CBT for 
psychosis (CBTp) based upon research evidence from 5 randomised controlled 
trials which omitted from the analysis those with the most severe symptoms 
(NICE, 2014 pp 119).  In the context of this study and discourses around 
difficulties in implementing/absence of CBTp in these settings, it would be 
recommended that NICE guidelines are also revised to support therapeutic 
approaches which the populations of inpatient settings, are able to access, such 
as open dialogue or non-verbal forms of therapies, e.g. the arts therapies as 
discussed above, giving emphasis to culturally located understandings of 
distress. 
 
Trainings 
Narrow understandings and constructions of RFT or of the ‘ready’ subject could 
be seen to stem from  
• Constructions taught at undergraduate level, for example “abnormal 
psychology”, which could potentially encourage a limited and limiting 
conceptualisation of what it means to be human. 
• A split between clinical psychologists and the groups they work with. i.e. 
those of lower socioeconomic status and/or differing ethnic backgrounds, 
resultant in socio-culturally-situated expectations around a ‘ready’ 
subject.  
As therapy and the ready subject are constructed in this study within a narrow 
range of subjectivities, primarily those which mirror the socioeconomic, 
educational and ethnic backgrounds of the participants, we may need to 
examine how the training courses support and broaden the experiences of 
trainees who may have little experience of other cultures, giving clinical 
psychologists more tools and better understandings to address the needs of the 
populations they work with and to work sensitively with these discrepancies. 
 
This thesis has looked at how readiness for therapy is discursively constructed 
by clinicians working in inpatient acute settings. Through examining their 
constructions of RFT we can see how a seemingly ‘common sense’ concept 
has the capacity to impact the subjectivities of both patients and clinicians, and 
their access to therapy, highlighting the importance of evaluating  the concepts 
used in clinical psychology in order to expand our practice and give equal 
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weight to the voice of the patient. In the words of Bakhtin: “A plurality of 
independent and unmerged voices and consciousnesses, a genuine polyphony 
of fully valid voices” (Bakhtin, 1993). 
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APPENDIX A: Overview Of Power Threat Meaning Framework 
 
The Power Threat Meaning Framework: Summary Core principles of the 
PTM Framework  
The Power Threat Meaning Framework is a new perspective on why people 
sometimes experience a whole range of forms of distress, confusion, fear, 
despair, and troubled or troubling behaviour. It is an alternative to the more 
traditional models based on psychiatric diagnosis. It applies not just to people 
who have been in contact with the mental health or criminal justice systems, but 
to all of us.  
The Framework summarises and integrates a great deal of evidence about the 
role of various kinds of power in people’s lives; the kinds of threat that misuses 
of power pose to us; and the ways we have learned as human beings to 
respond to threat. In traditional mental health practice, these threat responses 
are sometimes called ‘symptoms’. The Framework also looks at how we make 
sense of these difficult experiences, and how messages from wider society can 
increase our feelings of shame, self-blame, isolation, fear and guilt.  
The main aspects of the Framework are summarised in these questions, which 
can apply to individuals, families or social groups:  
▪ ‘What has happened to you?’ (How is Power operating in your life?)  
▪ ‘How did it affect you?’ (What kind of Threats does this pose?)  
▪  ‘What sense did you make of it?’ (What is the Meaning of these 
situations and experiences to you?)  
▪ ‘What did you have to do to survive?’ (What kinds of Threat Response 
are you using?)  
In addition, the two questions below help us to think about what skills and 
resources people might have, and how we might pull all these ideas and 
responses together into a personal narrative or story:  
▪ ‘What are your strengths?’ (What access to Power resources do you 
have?) 
▪ ‘What is your story?’ (How does all this fit together?)  
Possible uses of the PTM Framework  
The Power Threat Meaning Framework can be used as a way of helping people 
to create more hopeful narratives or stories about their lives and the difficulties 
they may have faced or are still facing, instead of seeing themselves as 
blameworthy, weak, deficient or ‘mentally ill’. It highlights the links between 
wider social factors such as poverty, discrimination and inequality, along with 
traumas such as abuse and violence, and the resulting emotional distress or 
troubled behaviour. It also shows why those of us who do not have an obvious 
history of trauma or adversity can still struggle to find a sense of self- worth, 
meaning and identity.  
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The Framework describes the many different strategies people use, from 
automatic bodily reactions to deliberately-chosen ways of coping with 
overwhelming emotions, in order to survive and protect themselves and meet 
their core needs. It suggests a wide range of ways that may help people to 
move forward. For some people this may be therapy or other standard 
interventions including, if they help someone to cope, psychiatric drugs. For 
others, the main needs will be for practical help and resources, perhaps along 
with peer support, art, music, exercise, nutrition, community activism and so on. 
Underpinning all this, the Framework offers a new perspective on distress which 
takes us beyond the individual and shows that we are all part of a wider struggle 
for a fairer society.  
One of the most important aspects of the Framework is the attempt to outline 
common or typical patterns in the ways people respond to the negative impacts 
of power - in other words, patterns of meaning-based responses to threat. This 
part of the Framework, like all of it, is still in a process of development. 
However, the evidence summarised in the Framework does suggest that there 
are common ways in which people in a particular culture are likely to respond to 
certain kinds of threat such as being excluded, rejected, trapped, coerced or 
shamed. It may be useful to draw on these patterns to help develop people’s 
personal stories. These general patterns can help to give people a message of 
acceptance and validation. The patterns can also assist us in designing 
services that meet people’s real needs, as well as suggesting ways of 
accessing support, benefits and so on that are not dependent on having a 
diagnosis.  
In addition, the Framework offers a way of thinking about culturally-specific 
understandings of distress without seeing them through a Western diagnostic 
model. It encourages respect for the many creative and non-medical ways of 
supporting people around the world, and the varied forms of narrative and 
healing practices that are used across cultures.  
Taking the PTM Framework further  
It is important to note that Power Threat Meaning is an over-arching framework 
which is not intended to replace all the ways we currently think about and work 
with distress. Instead, the aim is to support and strengthen the many examples 
of good practice which already exist, while also suggesting new ways forward.  
The Framework has wider implications than therapeutic or clinical work. The 
main document (link below) suggests how it can offer constructive alternatives 
in the areas of service design and commissioning, professional training, 
research, service user involvement and public information. There are also 
important implications for social policy and the wider role of equality and social 
justice. It is a work in progress, offered as a resource for any individuals, groups 
or organisations interested in developing it further.  
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APPENDIX B: Table 1. Links between therapeutic orientations and understanding of Readiness for Therapy (RFT)  
 
This table will clarify how the constructions of RFT map onto therapeutic approaches and address the key issues. Please note that this 
table is, in itself, an illustrative construction; it is only one representation of constructs which are rarely straightforward, are multifactorial 
and conceptually overlapping. Furthermore, clinical psychologists do not tend to understand their clients solely from one position.  
 
 
Therapeutic 
Approach 
Constructions of 
Therapy 
Main focus & Assumptions of 
the human subject 
Understandings of what 
constitutes RFT 
Constructions of 
RFT 
Psychoanalytic 
 
 
- Subject gains 
self-knowledge 
through expertise 
of therapist 
- Intra-relational, intra-psychic  
- A ‘non-rational’ decentred subject: 
driven by unconscious processes 
such as defence mechanisms and 
splitting 
- Introspection, projection and 
isolation  
- Psychological-mindedness, 
- Acceptance of patterns as 
maladaptive 
- Psychic pain 
- Intra-psychic flexibility 
- Readiness  
- Suitability  
- Psychological-
mindedness 
Cognitive 
Behavioural 
 
 
- Collaborative 
- Negative 
behaviours and 
faulty cognitions 
identified and 
corrected by 
therapist 
- Intra-relational  
- A rational unitary subject: able to 
recognise their thoughts, feelings 
and behaviours as ‘irrational’ and 
amenable to modification  
 
- Accessibility of automatic 
thoughts and the awareness 
and differentiation of emotions, 
thoughts and behaviours 
- Compliance with treatment 
- Completion of treatment 
- Readiness for  
change 
- Motivation 
- Insight 
- Engagement 
 
Narrative 
Systemic 
 
 
- Involving family 
and network. 
- A conversation 
as a journey with 
no single correct 
direction  
- Inter-relational 
- Focus on the role of language in 
the construction and experience of 
the self  
- Individual viewed as part of their 
family system and cannot be fully 
understood in isolation 
- Ability to re-author or co-create 
a narrative account of the 
development of the problem  
- Context and relationship 
factors viewed as important for 
the ‘fit’ of therapy to patient 
- Excavation of the 
dominant story: client 
as “fused” with their 
story 
- Curiosity 
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Appendix C: Table 2: Summary of dimensions covered by insight scales  
 
Dimension of insight   PANSS   ITAQ SAI SUMD BCIS 
1. Acceptance of illness label        X X X X  
2. Awareness of having a mental 
disorder 
  X X  
3. Perceived need for treatment  X X   
4. Awareness of treatment benefiT    X  
5. Attribution of benefits to 
treatment 
 X    
6. Awareness of signs and 
symptoms 
  X X X 
7. Attribution of signs and 
symptoms to having a mental 
disorder 
   X X 
8. Awareness of social 
consequences of illness 
   X X 
9. Lack of judgement  X    
 
 
 
(Tranulis, Corin & Kirmayer, 2008 p. 231) 
 
PANSS = Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale (Kay et al., 1987) 
ITAQ = Insight and Treatment Attitude Questionnaire (McEvoy et al., 1989) SAI 
= Schedule for Assessing the three components of Insight (David et al., 1992)  
SUMD = Scale to assess Unawareness of Mental Disorder (Amador et al., 
1993) 
 
  
125 
 
APPENDIX D: University of East London Ethical Approval  
 
 
 
NOTICE OF ETHICS REVIEW DECISION  
 
For research involving human participants 
BSc/MSc/MA/Professional Doctorates in Clinical, Counselling and Educational 
Psychology 
 
 
SUPERVISOR:  Laura McGrath      REVIEWER: Neil Rees 
 
 
STUDENT: Rowan Reiss      
 
Title of proposed study: Constructions of Readiness for Therapy on Adult Acute 
Wards 
 
Course: Professional Doctorate in Clinical Psychology 
 
 
DECISION (Delete as necessary):  
 
 
*APPROVED, BUT MINOR CONDITIONS ARE REQUIRED BEFORE THE 
RESEARCH COMMENCES 
 
 
 
APPROVED: Ethics approval for the above named research study has been granted from the 
date of approval (see end of this notice) to the date it is submitted for assessment/examination. 
 
APPROVED, BUT MINOR AMENDMENTS ARE REQUIRED BEFORE THE RESEARCH 
COMMENCES (see Minor Amendments box below): In this circumstance, re-submission of an 
ethics application is not required but the student must confirm with their supervisor that all minor 
amendments have been made before the research commences. Students are to do this by 
filling in the confirmation box below when all amendments have been attended to and emailing 
a copy of this decision notice to her/his supervisor for their records. The supervisor will then 
forward the student’s confirmation to the School for its records.  
 
NOT APPROVED, MAJOR AMENDMENTS AND RE-SUBMISSION REQUIRED (see Major 
Amendments box below): In this circumstance, a revised ethics application must be submitted 
and approved before any research takes place. The revised application will be reviewed by the 
same reviewer. If in doubt, students should ask their supervisor for support in revising their 
ethics application.  
 
 
Minor amendments required (for reviewer): 
 
I’m not convinced that you have attended enough to the issue of possible deception in 
section 3.2. The rationale for not fully informing potential participants is clear but this 
may cause some consternation, particularly as you will provide a summary of the 
research to participants and if we keep your 3rd research question in mind re: 
inequalities in access to therapy. Participants may feel unfairly deceived. 
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You say that you will seek consent again at the end of interview but you don’t say you 
will give participants any further information about your research questions or approach 
to analysis before seeking this second consent so it’s unclear how this addresses the 
issue. I think you need to consider giving them some if this further information before 
seeking the second consent. 
 
 
 
Major amendments required (for reviewer): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Confirmation of making the above minor amendments (for students): 
 
I have noted and made all the required minor amendments, as stated above, before 
starting my research and collecting data. 
 
Student’s name (Typed name to act as signature): Rowan Reiss   
Student number: U1129027    
 
Date: 02.03.2015 
 
 
        
ASSESSMENT OF RISK TO RESEACHER (for reviewer) 
 
If the proposed research could expose the researcher to any of kind of emotional, 
physical or health and safety hazard? Please rate the degree of risk: 
 
 
HIGH 
 
MEDIUM 
 
LOW 
 
 
Reviewer comments in relation to researcher risk (if any): 
 
 
 
 
 
Reviewer (Typed name to act as signature):   Neil Rees  
 
Date:  19.02.15 
 
 
X 
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This reviewer has assessed the ethics application for the named research study on behalf of the 
School of Psychology Research Ethics Committee (moderator of School ethics approvals) 
 
 
 
 
PLEASE NOTE:  
*For the researcher and participants involved in the above named study to be covered by UEL’s 
insurance and indemnity policy, prior ethics approval from the School of Psychology (acting on 
behalf of the UEL Research Ethics Committee), and confirmation from students where minor 
amendments were required, must be obtained before any research takes place.  
 
*For the researcher and participants involved in the above named study to be covered by UEL’s 
insurance and indemnity policy, travel approval from UEL (not the School of Psychology) must 
be gained if a researcher intends to travel overseas to collect data, even if this involves the 
researcher travelling to his/her home country to conduct the research. Application details can be 
found here: http://www.uel.ac.uk/gradschool/ethics/fieldwork/ 
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APPENDIX E: Participant Information Letter 
 
PARTICIPANT INVITATION LETTER 
  
 
UNIVERSITY OF EAST LONDON 
   School of Psychology 
Stratford Campus 
Water Lane 
London E15 4LZ 
 
The Principal Investigator(s) 
NAME: Rowan Reiss  
U1129027@uel.ac.uk   
 
Consent to Participate in a Research Study 
The purpose of this letter is to provide you with the information that you need to 
consider in deciding whether to participate a research study. The study is being 
conducted as part of Doctorate of Clinical Psychology degree at the University of East 
London. 
 
Project Title 
 
Constructions of Readiness for Therapy on Adult Acute Wards 
 
Project Description 
The aim of the study is to explore how clinicians, including clinical psychologists, 
psychiatrists and psychiatric nurses construct their practice in relation to the idea of 
their clients’ readiness for therapy and the implications of these constructions on 
clinical practice in inpatient psychiatric settings. The study is interested in the use of 
language and how people talk about readiness for therapy. The study will focus on three 
main areas:  
• How you understand the idea of the concept of readiness for therapy 
• How people talk about readiness for therapy in your work and in services 
• How the idea of readiness for therapy plays into decisions of who gets access to 
therapy 
Participants will be asked to discuss this topic during an interview with the researcher. 
They will also be asked to participate in a method called memory work in order to 
gather data in closer detail. Interviews will last for 50-60 minutes. 
Guidance on participating in memory work 
You will be asked to write two memories in preparation for the interview: one about a 
particular time when you have made a decision about when someone was ready for 
therapy and another about time when you have made the decision that someone was not 
ready for therapy, and submit these prior to the interview with the researcher. These 
memories will then be discussed during the research interview. All memories will be 
anonymised for the interview. Please write in as much detail as you can remember about 
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it and please write in the third person. As guidance an example is provided below. This 
is a different subject but is to give you an idea of how memory work is done.  
A further example of this can be found in Anne’s memory, where she describes 
the process she goes through before seeking help: 
‘There was no-one home and the lights were all off. She rang everyone with the 
sole intention of checking no-one was arriving home anytime soon. These 
phonecalls which lasted a few minutes each seemed to go on forever as she 
impatiently waited to go online. The room was cold as she entered and she 
shivered as she turned the computer on, partly in nerves, but also the room was 
colder than usual. She fetched her baggy cardigan which was comforting since it 
was baggy and did not show her true form and yet perversely made her look 
fatter, a confirmation of her incentive [.] She heated up as the discussion 
progressed, indeed she actually felt rather hot, maybe this was the crying, still 
she felt able to remove her cardigan (her armoury) and it felt rather symbolic of 
the moment.’ (Anne, 35–40; 59–61) 22 
 
The steps are as follows: 
1. Write 1 to 2 pages about a particular episode, action, or event  
2. Write in the third person using a pseudonym. 
3. Write in as much detail as possible, including even what might be considered to be 
trivial or inconsequential. 
4. Describe the experience, do not import interpretation, explanation, or biography. 23 
 
Confidentiality of the Data 
The names of the participants will be securely stored in a location accessible only to the 
researcher. The interviews will be transcribed by both the researcher and an assistant, 
employed specifically for the purpose of transcription who will be required to sign a 
confidentiality agreement. All identifiable information including names, service names 
and locations will be anonymised both in the transcripts and in the final report. The 
Director of Studies will read anonymised interview data only. Upon completion of this 
study, all audio-recordings will be destroyed, however data may be retained, in the form 
of securely stored anonymised transcripts, in case of further development for the 
purposes of publication post completion of the study.  
 
Location 
 
The interviews will be held at a time convenient to you in a private room at your place 
of work. 
                                                          
22 McGrath, L., Reavey, P., and Brown, S. D. (2008). The scenes and spaces of anxiety: Embodied expressions of distress in public 
and private fora.  Emotion, Space and Society 1: 56-64 
23 Crawford, J., Kippaz, S., Onyx, J., 1992. Emotion & Gender: Constructing Meaning from Memory. Sage, London. 
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Disclaimer 
You are not obliged to take part in this study and should not feel coerced. You are free 
to withdraw consent up until two months before the proposed submission date (May 
2017). ‘Withdrawal’ will involve deciding not to participate in your research and the 
opportunity to have the data you have supplied destroyed on request. Should you choose 
to withdraw from the study you may do so without disadvantage to yourself and without 
any obligation to give a reason. Please feel free to ask me any questions. If you are 
happy to continue you will be asked to sign a consent form prior to your participation 
and to reconfirm consent on completion of the interview process. Please retain this 
invitation letter for reference.  
 
If you have any questions or concerns about how the study has been conducted, please 
contact the study’s supervisor Dr Laura McGrath, School of Psychology, University of 
East London, Water Lane, London E15 4LZ. Email address l.h.mcgrath@uel.ac.uk 
or  
Chair of the School of Psychology Research Ethics Sub-committee: Dr. Mark Finn, 
School of Psychology, University of East London, Water Lane, London E15 4LZ. 
(Tel: 020 8223 4493. Email: m.finn@uel.ac.uk) 
 
Thank you in anticipation. 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
 
Rowan Reiss 
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APPENDIX F: Clinical Vignette – Music Therapy 
 
Before I started training to be a clinical psychologist and whilst working as a 
music therapist on inpatient wards and psychiatric intensive care units (PICU’s), 
I had the privilege to meet David. An Afro-Caribbean man in his early-thirties 
David had stabbed his sister six years previously and had not spoken since. I 
met David on the PICU where I worked. He was highly anxious and still not 
speaking. He would remain in his room most of the time and when he did come 
out would slide along the corridors with his back to the wall and his hand over 
his mouth, visibly afraid. The multidisciplinary team’s frustration with David’s 
inability to, or choice not to speak was palpable. In meetings discussion 
revolved around how David’s risk could possibly be assessed if he did not 
speak. One day I came onto the ward and learned that there was a plan for 
David to be given ECT. I challenged this and questioned why there was a move 
to give this treatment, recommended as a fourth-line treatment for intractable 
depression, to a man diagnosed with psychosis. Did the team think that he 
could be ‘shocked’ into speaking? When I started working with David he would 
not come to the music therapy room with me. I asked him if it would be ok for 
me to come and visit him once a week, to stand by the door to his room and 
spend some time with him. He nodded. After three months of visiting David 
each week, sometimes talking to him, sometimes remaining quiet, I asked him, 
not for the first time, whether he’d like to come to see the music therapy room 
with me. When he agreed I panicked: I hadn’t expected him to agree and the 
room wasn’t set up for a session. Nonetheless he came to the room and I then 
met with David for music therapy sessions for the next nine months. We worked 
purely non-verbally. Sometimes David would use the instruments, sometimes 
not. Sometimes we did some work around breath and breathing exercises and 
making small non-verbal vocal sounds. It was not perfect. Sometimes I got 
drawn into the dynamic of frustration expressed by the other members of the 
team. Feeling pressure to prove music therapy ‘worked’ and to produce a verbal 
result. This resulted in one memorable session where I must have looked visibly 
despondent and David tapped me on the arm and proceeded to “show me” how 
strong his breath was by blowing out all his air very rapidly. Six months later 
and I passed David in the hallway of the main psychiatric inpatient unit, a 
separate, open ward in the same building as the locked PICU. David saw me, 
waved, smiled and then carried on to wherever he was headed. He still, to my 
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knowledge, has yet to say a word but had been discharged from the PICU to 
the open ward and was eventually discharged into the community. Thinking 
back to that time now, as I come to the end of a doctorate which has equipped 
me further to think critically about clinical work, I have reflected many times on 
how much I learned from working with David: how teams can become frustrated 
and act in questionable ways if a patient does not ‘fit’ into their ways of working 
and the need to asses, how important it is to have time for trust to develop, the 
pressure to produce measurable ‘outcomes’, and how, whilst the format and 
outcome of therapy wasn’t what I might have expected, it was not for me as the 
therapist to judge what was meaningful and what was not to my non-verbal co-
narrator. 
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APPENDIX G: Interview Structure 
 
Interview structure and prompts 
 
1. Can you talk me through the two memories you sent me? 
Prompts and follow up questions depending on content and responses 
but could include: 
- What made you select this particular memory? 
- Could you tell me a bit about the time when it happened? Who else 
was involved? 
- Were there many emotions around this memory? 
- How typical/not-typical is it? 
- How does it relate to other experiences you’ve had on this subject? 
 
2. Can you tell me a bit about what types of psychological therapies 
are available on the ward and what you think of them? 
 
3. When do you send people to these different therapies? / Can you 
give me an example of a time when you’ve sent people to these 
therapies, and why?  
 
4. What would be the typical reason you would send someone to 
psychology/psychotherapy.  
 
5. What kind of therapies would you like to be available/what do you 
think is missing? 
 
6. What does the concept of readiness for therapy mean to you?  
 
 
7. Could you describe to me the process by which you assess/decide 
when/if someone is ready for therapy? 
 
8. Can you talk me through what kind of things you think about when 
deciding? 
 
9. Could you give me an example of a time when you’ve decided not to 
proceed with therapy? 
 
10. Do you discuss these decisions with the team/referrer?  
 
11. What views/ideas/factors do you think impact those clinical 
discussions/decisions? 
 
12. How do you discuss this idea with other professionals? 
 
13. Are there groups of patients who are more likely to be not 
ready/ready for therapy in your experience? 
 
14. In situations where people are deemed not ready how regularly are 
they reassessed? 
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Further prompts: 
 
- I was interested in what you just said about xyz, can you tell me a 
little more about that? 
- How did that make you feel? 
- Is that something that happens a lot? 
- Are there times when the opposite happens? 
 
Summarise and check but do not interpret: “Is this what you meant by 
that?”. 
 
During talking about the research and consent 
Make clear that you’re looking at language and how people talk about readiness 
for therapy. 
How people understand the concept of readiness for therapy or how people talk 
about it in your services. And how this idea plays into who gets to access 
therapy. 
 
 
Recording: Dictaphone  
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APPENDIX H: CONSENT FORM 
 
CONSENT FORM  
 
UNIVERSITY OF EAST LONDON 
 
School of Psychology 
Stratford Campus 
Water Lane 
London E15 4LZ 
The Principal Investigator(s) 
NAME: Rowan Reiss  
U1129027@uel.ac.uk   
 
Consent to participate in a research study  
Constructions of Readiness for Therapy on Adult Acute Wards 
 
I have the read the information sheet relating to the above research study and have been 
given a copy to keep. The nature and purposes of the research have been explained to 
me, and I have had the opportunity to discuss the details and ask questions about this 
information. I understand what is being proposed and the procedures in which I will be 
involved have been explained to me. 
 
I understand that my involvement in this study, and particular data from this research, 
will remain strictly confidential. Only the researcher(s) involved in the study will have 
access to identifying data. It has been explained to me what will happen once the 
research study has been completed. 
 
I hereby freely and fully consent to participate in the study which has been fully 
explained to me. Having given this consent I understand that I have the right to 
withdraw from the study at any time without disadvantage to myself and without being 
obliged to give any reason.  
 
Participant’s Name (BLOCK CAPITALS)  
 
………………………………………………………………………………………. 
 
Participant’s Signature  
 
……………………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
Researcher’s Name (BLOCK CAPITALS)  
 
……………………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
Researcher’s Signature  
 
………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
Date: ……………………..……. 
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APPENDIX I: TRANSCRIPTION CONVENTIONS  
 
(.)   Indicate a pause of less than 1 second 
((x))  Indicate a pause of more than 1 second, with x replaced 
with the number of seconds e.g. 3 seconds as ((3)) 
{LG}    Laughter 
{LS}    Lip smack 
{BR}   Intake of breath 
::    Emphasis and/or exaggeration of letter sound e.g. not:: 
-th- (+there)  Indicates a breakoff of utterance e.g. th-Indicates a breakoff 
of utterance, where reasonable guess can be made of the 
intended word 
(())   Unintelligible speech  
XXX    Replace any place name to preserve anonymity  
mhm/mmm/eh Sounds transcribed phonetically 
PX Participant followed by a number to denote which 
participant e.g P6 = participant 6 
RR Interviewers initials  
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APPENDIX J: STAGES OF ANALYSIS  
 
 
Stage of 
Analysis 
Description 
 
 
1. What is being 
constructed? 
 
 
This stage involves a thorough exploration of the 
discursive object as per the research question. 
 
 
2. How is it being 
constructed and 
problematised? 
 
 
What are the different constructions that are presented in the 
data? What discourses are drawn upon to make these 
constructions possible? How are constructions problematised?  
(Problematisation refers to the construction of the discursive 
object as ‘problematic’ and, thus, knowable and visible.  The 
problematised discursive object is a product of the intersection 
of alternate discourses.  They reveal knowledge/power 
relations.   
 
 
3. Functionality of 
the construction 
 
Questions are asked of the data, which include; How is 
the discursive object being made a problem?  What 
actions can be achieved through the different 
constructions of the discursive object?  How do these 
discourses problematise function?  
 
 
4. Identification of 
discursive 
subjects 
 
 
This stage requires the consideration of the subject 
positions available resulting from the different 
constructions of the discursive object.   
 
 
5. Processes of 
subjectification 
 
 
This stage involves a exploring the implications for 
subjectivity; what can be experienced as a result of 
assuming various subject positions.  It is concerned with 
the relationship between discourse and subjectivity.  As 
discourses make available “certain-ways-of seeing the 
world, and certain-ways-of being in the world” (Willig, 
2008, p.113), they can be said to construct social and 
psychological realities.  Once having assumed a subject 
position as one’s own, a person is constrained to see the 
world through the lens of that particular position. 
.   
 
6. Technologies 
of power and 
implications for 
social practice 
 
As discourses warrant social action, what can be done, 
said and gained from within different discourses and 
different constructions of the discursive object at 
particular points of the text?  What are the different 
‘technologies of power/self’ evident in the text and how 
are they used.   
 
 
(Adams, 2016) 
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APPENDIX K:  VISUAL REPRESENTATION OF THE CODED TEXT 
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 Appendix K: Memory Work: The Method 
 
The following is a description of the procedural steps as used by Crawford et al. 
(1992). The procedure has been subsequently adopted by most, but not all 
subsequent work in Australia and New Zealand. Phase 1 concerns the writing of 
a memory. The five basic rules (from Haug et al., 1987) are as follows:  
 
1. Write 1 to 2 pages about a particular episode, action, or event (referred 
to by researchers as a trigger or cue).  
The writing of the memory has a number of benefits. It provides a discipline 
for the group, the group remembers more through writing and it gives the 
everyday experiences of life a status, which is considered of particular 
importance for women.  
 
2. Write in the third person using a pseudonym.  
The advantage of writing in the third person is that the participant can create 
personal distance, and view the memory from the outside. This helps to 
avoid justification of the experience.  
 
3. Write in as much detail as possible, including even what might be 
considered to be trivial or inconsequential.  
By asking for the trivial, it is hoped to avoid an evaluation by the participants 
of what was important or unimportant. Such an evaluation might well be 
socially defined.  
 
4. Describe the experience, do not import interpretation, explanation, or 
biography.  
Interpretation smoothes over the rough edges and covers up the absences 
and inconsistencies that are crucial elements of the analysis. The selection 
of a suitable trigger topic is vital, but difficult. In particular, a conventional 
topic is likely to produce a conventional, well-rehearsed response. The trick 
is to produce the more jagged stuff of personal lived experience. 
 
Phase 2 also proceeds through a set procedure (as identified in Crawford et al., 
1992, p. 49):   
 
1. Each memory-work group member expresses opinions and ideas about each 
written memory in turn.  
2. The collective looks for similarities and differences between the memories. 
The group members look for continuous elements among the memories whose 
relation to each other is not immediately apparent. Each member should 
question particularly those aspects of the events that do not appear amenable 
to comparison, without resorting to biography.  
3. Each member identifies cliches, generalisations, contradictions, cultural 
imperatives, metaphor, etc. This is one way of identifying the markers of the 
“takenfor-granted” social explication of the meaning of recurring events.  
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4. The group discusses theories, popular conceptions, sayings, and images 
about the topic, again as a way of identifying the common social explication of 
meaning around the topic.  
5. The group also examines what is not written in the memories (but that might 
be expected to be). Silences are sometimes eloquent pointers to issues of deep 
significance but are painful or particularly problematic to the author.  
6. The memory may be rewritten.  
 
This collective analysis aims to uncover the common social understanding of 
each event, the social meanings embodied in the actions described in the 
written accounts, and how these meanings are arrived: The collective reflection 
and examination may suggest revising the interpretation of the common 
patterns, and the analysis proceeds by moving from individual memories to the 
cross-sectional analysis and back again in a recursive fashion. . . . In this way 
the method is reflexive. It generates data and at the same time points to modes 
of action for the co-researchers. (Crawford et al., 1992, p. 49)  
 
In Phase 3, the material provided from both the written memories and the 
collective discussion of them, is further theorized. This phase is essentially a 
recursive process, in which the insights concerning the “common sense” of 
each set of memories is related back to the earlier discussions and to 
theoretical discussions within the wider academic literature. Phase 3 is usually 
done by one of the coresearchers as an individual (academic) exercise, though 
with drafts of this process subject to further discussion by other members of the 
collective. 
 
 
(Onyx & Small, 2001).  
 
